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CHAPTER I
Introduction
The phenomenon of resistance to behavior change is gen
erally recognized by counselors and therapists.
from a problematic perspective,

As viewed

resistance represents the

fundamental obstruction in effecting behavior change in the
client.

Resistance in psychotherapy has been equated with

"obstinacy"

(Evans, 1973),

"masochism"

(Horney, 1945).

"negativism"
Adler

(Nikelly, 1971), and

(cited in Nikelly,

1971)

interpreted client resistance as a depreciation tendency
which usually diminishes as therapy progresses.
These interpretations do little to further the under
standing of resistance to behavior change since they name
rather than explain the phenomenon.

Except for psychoana

lytic theory, very little theoretical work directly and sys
tematically addresses the nature of resistance to behavior
change.

However, other theoretical models exist which are

concerned with the determinants of behavior and the process
of behavior change.

These models provide a basis for

implicit assumptions regarding the phenomenon of resistance.
If resistance to behavior change is defined as any
process which impedes a person's capacity or desire to alter
established patterns of behavior, then any theoretical model
which addresses the following two issues suggests a concept

1
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of resistance:

(1) The model has a set of theoretical con

structs pertaining to the determinants of behavior, and these
determinants become a person's primary "reference source" for
establishing patterns of behavior;

(2) the model also

addresses the nature and extent that a person is constrained
by this particular reference source.

The first theoretical

issue deals with the etiology of present behavior,

and the

second issue is concerned with the locus or source of resis
tance to the alteration of present patterns of behavior.

The

second issue indicates how and why the determinants of pres
ent behavior persist as the primary reference source for par
ticular response sets, even when an individual seems to
express a sincere desire to change these patterns.
The existing theoretical models which address these two
issues can be classified by three general paradigms of resis
tance.

Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of these

three paradigms.

Although any given model may have charac

teristics of more than one of these general paradigms, the
primary aspects of a theory of behavior change and resistance
are represented more significantly in one of the paradigms as
opposed to another.

In Figure 1, note that the arrows indi

cate the proposed direction of determination of behavior, and
the broken circles represent the proposed locus or source of
resistance to altering the particular reference source or
determinant of behavior.
For example,

in Paradigm I, an arrow issues from the
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Paradigm

I:

Paradigm

II:

{ Past) ---------- ^
Past

^ •Present^'
,»

Paradigm III:

Key:

vv

Past I
>
v ^ ------- "C*

Present

^ = Determines.
f"

Figure 1.

Present

= Primary locus of resistance.

Three existing paradigms of resistance to behavior
change.

"past" and points toward the "present."

This represents the

theoretical proposition that one's past psychological experi
ences provide the primary reference source from which one's
present behavior is established.

The broken circle around

the "past" refers to the theoretical view which posits that
the primary locus or source of resistance to changing one's
present behavior remains within one's past psychological
experiences.

The implication is that the process of behavior

change requires interventions which alter the psychological
significance of one's past.

Psychoanalytic theory exempli

fies the conceptual framework depicted in Paradigm I.
Paradigm II also reflects the view that one's past expe
riences provide the primary reference source for one's pres
ent behavior.

However,

it differs from the first paradigm

because it emphasizes that the primary locus of resistance is
within one's present circumstances, not within one's past.
This paradigm implies that the process of behavior change
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must alter one's present conditions.

Learning theories

reflect this paradigm.
Paradigm III is viewed as striking an interactional or
combined effect between the first two.

It proposes that the

psychological significance of one's past determines one's
present experience;

in turn, one tends to structure one's

present experience to reinforce or revivify the significance
of one's past.

This third theoretical paradigm emphasizes an

interdependency between past and present experiences.

As

such, the locus of resistance to behavior change lies pri
marily within the dynamics of this interactional process.
The implication for psychotherapy is that a therapist must
intervene so as to redirect a person's present behavior away
from validating the psychological significance of past expe
riences.

Cognitive models and self-oriented

(phenomenologi

cal) theories of personality tend to exemplify this third
general paradigm.
This thesis presents an alternative paradigm of resis
tance and a theoretical model which is based upon it.

The

purpose for developing such an alternative is to focus on a
theoretical source of resistance which has not been previ
ously emphasized, but is viewed as being a very significant
source of resistance to behavior change.

That is, although

the existing three paradigms account for some important
potential aspects why an individual maintains certain pat
terns of behavior,

the existing theories fail to emphasize
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the primary potential source of resistance to behavior
change.

Since psychotherapy is a process geared toward

altering certain existing patterns of behavior
tudes, feelings,

and/or actions),

(i.e., atti

its efficacy is ultimately

based upon how well it overcomes the sources of resistance to
such behavior changes.

Thus, one of the most important con

tributions of this alternative paradigm and model of resis
tance to behavior change is with regard to the implications
for psychotherapy procedures generated by such a concept.

Existing Theoretical Views on
Resistance to Behavior Change
The framework for classifying existing theoretical views
of resistance into three general paradigms is introduced in
the previous remarks.

In the present section, each of these

three paradigms is discussed further.

Subsequently,

the dis

cussion focuses on critically evaluating the concepts of
resistance which are represented by each of the paradigms.
Such discussion will involve comparing and contrasting the
various theoretical propositions held by each of the para
digms.

The implications derived from this evaluation will

provide the theoretical backdrop for presenting an alterna
tive paradigm, Paradigm IV.
Paradigm I:
In general,

IPast)---------- >

Present

the view of personality exhibited in Para

digm I is that the etiology of a person's present behavior
can be understood in terms of significant past psychological

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n of th e cop yrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

6
experiences.

It emphasizes that the primary sources of

resistance to altering present patterns of behavior are
within the contents of past experiences.

It presumes that a

person is constrained or psychologically fixated to certain
past patterns of behavior and that these past patterns con
tinue to be the reference source for establishing and main
taining present patterns of behavior.

Paradigm I assumes

"critical periods" of personality development exist in which
certain behavior patterns are formulated as strategies for
coping with the demands associated with these development
periods.

These early,

formative experiences provide the

basis or reference source for one's attempt to cope with the
perceived demands within one's present life conditions.
Classical psychoanalytic theorists appear to exemplify
Paradigm I.

That is, they reflect the concept of resistance

which assumes that the effects of experiences during certain
critical stages of development become the basis of resistance
to behavior change.

Specifically, these effects result from

an individual's earliest attempts to maximize instinctual
gratification while minimizing anxiety

(S. Freud, 1924).

According to Freud, this process of maximizing gratification
while minimizing anxiety involves unconscious operations.
The primary function of these unconscious processes is to
reduce the anxiety associated with achieving instinctual
gratification.

Instinctual urges, which have become asso

ciated with societal-parental or reality-based punishment,
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tend to evoke anxiety within a person when the urges become
conscious.

Freud suggested that each mental process is first

harbored within the unconscious psychical system.

Only under

certain conditions can a mental process proceed further into
the conscious system.

When certain unconscious trends of

thought are turned back from entering the preconscious, these
trends are then viewed as incapable of being conscious and
are termed "repressed"

(S. Freud,

1924).

Certain trends of thought remain repressed because of
the anxiety attached to them.
sexual development,

The individual, during psycho-

forms ego defense mechanisms which serve

to repress unacceptable thoughts or urges.

This does not

mean that the gratification associated with such trends can
not be attained, but that the ego permits the process of
gratification to occur in a manner which minimizes anxiety
and involves unconscious processes.
resistance is repression,
ego

The process underlying

and this process is served by the

(A. Freud, 1966; S. Freud, 1924).
According to psychoanalytic theory, resistance to behav

ior change is manifested when such change becomes a disrup
tive force against the maintenance of established ego defense
mechanisms.

That is, the ego is antagonistic to the process

of change when it diminishes its capacity to remain a vigi
lant guard against the anxiety associated with unacceptable
thought trends.

This source of resistance comprises a per

son's system of "ego resistances" against unacceptable,
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unconscious thought trends.
S.

Freud

(1924) also identified other forms or manifes

tations of resistance as the "transference resistances" and,
relatedly, those resistances which have their source in the
"repetition compulsion."

The locus or source of these fac

tors of resistance is also bound to past experience.
The repetition compulsion is the theoretical construct
for the process by which the very earliest object relations
are revived in one's present object relations.

The repeti

tion compulsion underlies both the transference of libidinal
(id) impulses and the transference of ego defenses against
these impulses

(A. Freud,

unconscious process,

1966).

Since this remains an

the individual dissociates the original

situation from which the earliest defenses were developed
from their present operations.

As Reich

(1949) proposed,

these defenses often assume fixed character traits such as
arrogance, a rigid body posture, or a fixed smile.

The

original function of these defenses was to reduce the anxiety
associated with infantile id impulses.

However, due to their

unconscious fixation, these defenses remain as personality
traits apart from their historic sources.
The process of the repetition compulsion is related to
the phenomenon of transference.

The transference of libid

inal impulses occurs when the person begins to experience
emotions such as love, hate, anxiety, or jealousy in relation
to a person or object which are not warranted in the actual
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situation.

What is said to be occurring is that the individ

ual is unconsciously revivifying infantile id impulses—
early affective states which have been experienced in rela
tion to the individual's earliest objects.

The person is

unconsciously imputing to the present object the properties
or attributes of the infantile object relationship.

The

repetition compulsion not only exerts its force to transfer
infantile id impulses to one's present situation, but it also
revives the former defensive operations against these
instincts, which are the transference of defenses

(A. Freud,

1966) .
As suggested earlier,

in psychoanalytic theory, resis

tances to change are defenses designed to minimize anxiety
while maximizing one's instinctual gratification.

Patterns

of behavior which are part of the ego's defense mechanisms
enlisted to minimize sources of anxiety tend to be resistant
to change when the particular change undermines the effec
tiveness of the ego to maintain repression of these sources
of anxiety.

In general, the greater the source of anxiety,

the greater the resistance is to relinquishing the behaviors
which are associated with the ego defensive operations used
to repress this source of anxiety.
Sources of anxiety are based in infantile experiences.
Young children regard their instinctual impulses according
to parental approval or disapproval.

Disapproval of instinc

tual gratification engenders anxiety associated with
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restrictions,

loss of support, rejection, or abandonment.

Thus, the infantile ego fears the instincts because it is so
dependent on the outside world but yet so fearful of it.
Consequently,

in young children, defense mechanisms are

motivated by objective anxiety.

As the individual develops

toward more independent, autonomous modes of functioning,
characteristic of maturation, these infantile defense mechan
isms are often retained even though the historic sources
(infantile fears)

no longer have any basis in actuality.

Thus, what were objective sources of anxiety during infancy
become transformed into neurotic mechanisms of defense in
adulthood via the unconscious process of the repetition com
pulsion and the related transference phenomenon
1966; S. Freud,

(A. Freud,

1924).

In psychoanalysis,

the phenomenon of resistance is not

viewed merely as an obstacle in the psychotherapy process,
but it becomes the object of the therapy process itself.

An

analyst attempts to determine the psychological significance
of an analysand's present defensive operations which are
manifested as resistance in terms of their unconscious link
to historic sources of anxiety.

The theoretical assumption

is that while this link remains unconscious,

the analysand's

resistance to relinquishing the defensive operations remains.
Paradigm II presents some contrasting views regarding
resistance to behavior change to those of Paradigm I.

It is

recalled that Paradigm II is represented as follows:
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Paradigm II:

Past ----------^ {Present^

Paradigm II, like Paradigm I, also views that the pri
mary determinant of one's present behavior is one's past
experience.

Unlike Paradigm I, however, the locus or source

of resistance to changing present patterns of behavior is
within one's present conditions, according to this second
theoretical paradigm of resistance.

Learning theories and

their applied models represent the propositions associated
with Paradigm II.
Many learning theories are based on three broad assump
tions.

First, behavior is learned by the building up of

associations.

Second, persons are presumed to be hedonistic.

Third, behavior is environmentally determined.

The first

assumption suggests that complex patterns of behavior can be
understood in terms of the linkage or joining together of
simple associative bonds.

Watson

(1925)

termed the units of

these associative bonds as stimulus-response units which he
called reflexes.

The second assumption,

articulated in Thorndike's

(1905)

that of hedonism,

is

law of effect, which states

that in a given situation a behavior producing satisfaction
(pleasure) becomes associated with that situation.
when that situation recurs,
before to also recur.

Thus,

the behavior is more likely than

Any act or behavior within a given

situation producing discomfort becomes dissociated from that
situation so that when the situation recurs, the particular
behavior is less likely than before to recur.

In essence,
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Thorndike's law of effect seems to be a restatement of the
psychoanalytic assumption that one seeks gratification asso
ciated with pleasure and strives to avoid punishment or pain.
The third assumption, dealing with the view that one's behav
ior is primarily determined by environment,

suggests that all

persons are controlled by certain variables in their environ
ment.

This last assumption profoundly influences Paradigm

II's view of the locus or source of resistance to behavior
change.
Learning theories do not seem to adopt the reductionistic view of resistance that is maintained in psychoanalytic
theory.

Learning models do accept the psychoanalytic notion

that there is a kind of repetition compulsion, but learning
theories posit a different view to explain the process of the
phenomenon.

According to most learning models,

an individual

does repeat patterns of behavior which are based in past
experiences.

However, one's past experiences do not retain

the status of a primary reference source for one's present
behavior.

That is, there is nothing "magical" about one's

past experiences since one's present experiences serve to
either maintain a person's established patterns or they serve
as a basis for changing these patterns.

Analogous to the

repetition compulsion in many learning theories is the con
cept of the "behavioral repertoire."

According to this

concept, those behavior patterns which are most strongly
reinforced tend to persist; those which are not as strongly
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reinforced do not acquire as significant a position,

in hier-

archal terms, as do other more strongly reinforced patterns.
Behavior- change thus involves a restructuring of one's behav
ioral repertoire,

and this change process occurs within one's

present conditions apart from one's past experiences.
Three major types of conditioning models exist for
establishing behavior patterns:
(2) instrumental conditioning,

(1) classical conditioning,
and

(3) operant conditioning.

The basic characteristic of classical conditioning is that a
previously neutral stimulus acquires the capacity to elicit
a response because of its association with another stimulus
that automatically produces the same or similar response.
Thus,

in classical conditioning, a particular pattern of

behavior becomes established as a result of pairing a previ
ously neutral stimulus with an unconditioned stimulus, one
that automatically produces the response, enough times so
that the results are that the conditioned stimulus acquires
the power to produce the unconditioned response when intro
duced by itself.

This Pavlovian model

(Pavlov,

1927), clas

sical conditioning, clearly defines stimuli and response sets
and therefore provides an influential role in the development
of further learning models.

In terms of resistance,

the

classical conditioning model points to one's environmental
conditions as providing the primary source of resistance to
behavior change.

By systematically controlling which stimuli

are associated with a particular response set, not only can
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certain behavior patterns be initiated, but, in addition, by
manipulating the variables which initiated the patterns, one
can alter the behavior patterns which already have been
established.
The Hullian model

(Hull, 1943) of instrumental condi

tioning emphasizes behavior as motivational or goal-directed
activity.

In the Hullian model, behavior patterns become

associated with their effectiveness at drive reduction.

For

example, an organism which has built up a substantial hunger
drive due to deprivation of food is more likely to perform
behaviors associated with obtaining reinforcing stimuli which
reduce the hunger drive than is an organism for which the
hunger drive is not so strong.

The theory attempts to derive

lawful relationships among environmental influences which
affect an individual's internal drive states, and the conse
quences of certain response sets which reduce the individ
ual's internal drive states.

The Hullian model suggests two

factors or aspects of resistance to behavior change.

First,

consequences associated with a particular pattern of behavior
cannot be viewed independently, because the relative strengths
of drive states associated with those consequences also play
an important role in determining the significance of that
pattern of behavior.

Second, Hull's emphasis on drive states

suggests that resistance to behavior change relates to an
individual's reluctance to relinquish a particular pattern of
behavior which has been strongly associated with acquiring
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drive reduction.

The implication is that in order to attenu

ate this source of resistance,

the individual must perceive

an alternative pattern of behavior for acquiring similar
drive reduction.
The third major model of learning theories is operant
conditioning, developed by Skinner

(1953).

In this model,

responses are emitted by the individual and are called oper
ants .

Skinner, however, did not emphasize an internal moti

vation like Hull's drive state.

In a sense, Skinner adopted

the view that the individual tends to emit various behaviors
in a random fashion, and significance is subsequently endowed
to these behaviors as a result of the consequences associated
with these responses.

In operant conditioning,

the sources

of resistance to altering one's established behavioral reper
toire is ultimately bound to one's present conditions of
reinforcement in terms of its magnitude,

and its schedule of

occurrence in relation to the behavioral responses.

Accord

ingly, these sources of resistance can be counteracted to the
extent that control over these reinforcement factors can be
achieved.

Given this assumption,

the sources of resistance

against behavior change persist as a function of the relative
inability to control the variables associated with the condi
tions of reinforcement.
More recently developed learning models diverge from the
Skinnerian system, most notably those of social learning the
orists such as Bandura

(1969).

Such social learning
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theorists suggest that the Skinnerian view fails to address
adequately the occurrence of learning of specific responses
in the absence of direct reinforcement.

For Bandura and some

others, most social learning occurs as a function of observ
ing behavior and modeling the behavior of others.

Moreover,

the concept of "self-reinforcement" has been adopted by Ban
dura and others.

In essence, an individual is viewed as

having the capacity to internalize

(make covert associations)

and maintain associations in the absence of direct, external
reinforcing stimuli.

However, this concept does not present

a contradiction to the locus of resistance associated with
Paradigm II.

That is, although one can internalize previous

associations between patterns of behavior and the acquisition
of rewards, the resistance to relinquishing these patterns of
behavior is still contingent upon the reinforcement condi
tions in one's present circumstances.
Thus, the primary locus or source of resistance to
behavior change reflected in learning models remains within
the individual's present conditions.

From the psychothera

pist's view, resistance becomes a problem of logistics.

One

major logistical problem involves initiating certain intended
behavior patterns so that the reinforcement of these can
occur.

That is, operant conditioning requires that a given

behavior be generated in the first place in order that it be
paired with the reinforcing stimulus.

The technique of

modeling, as prescribed by Bandura and other social learning
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theorists, may be used to facilitate vicarious conditioning
as a way of mitigating against this aspect of resistance.
A second problem occurs when an individual's present
conditions of reinforcement are not readily amenable or acessible to external interventions.

A child's classroom behav

ior may be modified through a teacher's regulation of
reinforcement conditions in the classroom, but the teacher
may have little ability or desire to enforce matching condi
tions beyond the classroom setting.

A prison inmate may

exhibit significant behavior change as a result of stimulus
controls within a correctional institution, but the condi
tions out in the "streets" may fail to provide an adequate
reinforcement schedule to maintain these changes.

Thus, the

ability to control the process of generalization represents
another significant factor of resistance within the learning
m odels.
A third major factor of resistance within the learning
theory paradigm is associated with the problems of condition
ing inhibition of firmly established behavior patterns
through aversive control.
overeating,

Behavior such as cigarette smoking,

and certain drug addictions has intrinsic rein

forcing value associated with the behavior itself.

Because

of the intrinsic reinforcing stimuli associated with such
patterns of behavior,
behavior itself.
modalities,

the source of resistance is within the

This situation, within behavior therapy

is frequently associated with an attempt to
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introduce an aversive stimulus as a means of counteracting
the positive reinforcing stimuli intrinsic in the behavior
itself.

However,

it is a moot point as to whether a client

would continue in such a program beyond the controls of the
modification setting itself.

That is, many individuals would

probably have difficulty applying aversive stimuli to them
selves over a period of time.
In summation, Paradigm II, as represented by learning
theory models, posits that the primary locus or source of
resistance to behavior change is within one's present condi
tions.

Within this theoretical paradigm, the repetition of

past behavior patterns is not viewed as an automatic process;
rather, past behavior patterns are repeated because the indi
vidual anticipates the consequences to be similar to those
incurred in past experience.

Behavior change is resisted to

the extent that one persists in this anticipation.

Modifi

cation of behavior or behavior change does occur, theoreti
cally, when the individual "learns" that by inhibiting the
occurrence of a past response pattern to a particular stimu
lus, or by engaging in another given response set to a par
ticular stimulus event, the consequences provide greater
rewards than experienced in the past.

In this sense, Para

digm II views resistance primarily as a logistical problem.
This problem is one of control.

To the extent that the con

sequences of behavior can be regulated as per desire within
ongoing, present conditions, resistance to behavior change
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can be counteracted effectively.
The third existing paradigm of resistance, Paradigm III,
subsumes the phenomenological or self-oriented theories of
personality.
well.

It reflects cognitive models of behavior as

In this paradigm,

the primary locus of resistance is

within the interactional process between past and present
experiences and is represented as follows:
Paradigm III:

Past

t Present

It appears that the theoretical construct of the "self"
relates to this interactional process.

From past experiences

persons derive precepts of what their relationship to the
world should be, and these provide the cognitive frame of
reference for their perception of their present experiential
field.

In turn, their immediate experiences either reflect a

consistency with their preconceived relationship to the world,
or they conflict with this expectation.

One of the major

assumptions held by theorists who are identified with Para
digm III is that individuals strive to maintain an optimal
level of consistency between what they perceive should occur,
and the events which are actually experienced by individuals.
The motivational aspect underlying this presumed tendency has
been articulated by Adler
(1961), and Sullivan

(1963), Horney

(1945) , Rogers

(1953), among others.

Persons strive

to maintain their adopted position in relation to particular
objects because it ensures the persons'

psychological sig

nificance to these objects.
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Adler

(1963)

"self-esteem."

termed this tendency as one's striving for

A person develops a system of "plans" con

cerning how he/she must impact on others in order to elicit
outcomes which generate feelings of power or potency.

It is

an attempt to establish a position of significance or impor
tance in relation to certain objects so as to increase one's
ability to control the outcomes resulting from interactions
with these objects

(persons or otherwise).

Thus, achieving

such positional status provides psychological security
against feelings of helplessness and ineffectuality.
ing to Adler, one's

attaining such a position,
Horney's

(1945)

Accord

"life style" reflects one's plans for
leading to self-esteem.

theoretical position with regard to the

nature of such a striving is very similar to Adler's.

Horney

suggested that persons develop an "idealized image of self"
which represents their cognitive image of how they must
relate to others in order to minimize feelings of "basic
anxiety."

Basic anxiety has its roots in infantile feelings

of helplessness, of being overwhelmed by the "big world."
Like Adler, Horney proposed that one strives to secure a
relationship to objects which mitigates against feeling help
less and insignificant, reminiscent of infantile feelings.
Rogers

(1961) termed this motivational aspect as one's

striving for "self-worth."

According to Rogers, an individ

ual begins to experience anxiety or a feeling of vulner
ability when he/she perceives incongruence between the

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n of th e cop yrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

21
concept of self
world)

(one's preconceived relationship to the

and what one experiences in ongoing interactions with

the environment.

Such a situation signals a threat to self-

worth, because what the person believes he/she must be in
relation to others deviates from what one _is in relation to
others.
Sullivan's

(1953) theoretical construct of the "self

dynamism" also refers to the individual's system of inter
acting with objects, based on previous experiences in which
such interactions produced psychological security.

Again,

it

is a theoretical proposition which suggests that persons tend
to develop a cognitive system of precepts as to how they
should relate to certain objects in order to achieve a posi
tion of significance in relation to these objects.
The essential line of reasoning among these aforemen
tioned theorists is that the person's behavior is strongly
moderated by a wish to maintain an integrity of the self.

In

more operational terms, this is a desire to maintain congru
ence between one's precepts as to how one should relate to
certain objects to maintain a position of psychological sig
nificance

(i.e., esteem or worth), and what one perceives ijs

one's relationship to these objects.

Resistance to behavior

change can be understood in terms of the person's wish to
retain self-esteem or self-worth in the context of present
life conditions and demands.

Such resistance can be concep

tualized as represented by Paradigm III.

It is a person's
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past experiences which provide him/her with what the cogni
tively defined relationship to the world should be in order
to establish psychological significance and impact.

It is

the person's present, ongoing experiences which permit the
person to appraise to what extent the relationship with
others is as it should be, as defined by past experiences.
The interactional process encourages the development of psy
chological defenses in order to perceive things as expected
and dictated by past experiences.

In turn, the perception

of one's present experiences strengthens or reinforces these
expectations.

Thus, persons resist changes which undermine

their ability to generate present experiences to conform with
the expectations of what should be experienced in order to
maintain self-worth or self-esteem.

Such changes threaten

their ability to perceive congruence between what they should
be and what they actually are.
This interdependency between past and present experi
ences also underlies cognitive models of behavior.

In gen

eral, these models presume that significant past experiences
provide a cognitive or perceptual frame of reference from
which one experiences ongoing stimuli.

From a preestablished

cognitive system, one is able to derive significance or mean
ing from the occurrence of events.

An event by itself does

not evoke a particular emotional response, but the meaning
attributed to that event does.

This assumption underlies the

theoretical approaches taken by the cognitive models of
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behavior presented by Ellis
(1955), and McClelland

(1973), Festinger

(1951).

(1958), Kelly

From the previous discussion,

it also appears to be an implicit assumption held by Adler
(1963), Horney

(1945), Rogers

(1961), and Sullivan

(1953).

Self-esteem and self-worth are personal appraisals based on
a preconceived system for deriving the meaning or signifi
cance of events.
Festinger

(1958), Kelly

(1955), and McClelland

(1951)

addressed interactional process between past and present
experiences as a cognitive operation of "matching" the out
comes which one expects with those which actually occur.
These theorists also assume one's tendency to strive for
optimal consistency between what should happen
and what does happen

(realization).

(anticipation)

The nature of the out

comes which one expects is derived from past experience,

and

the outcomes which one experiences are derived from the per
ception of one's present circumstances.
While Festinger

(1958) and Kelly

(1955) suggested that

the optimal level of consistency one strives for is maximum
consistency or perfect matching, McClelland
a bi-phasic tendency.

(1951)

spoke of

According to McClelland, one strives

toward minimizing large discrepancies perceived between
expectation and actual occurrence, while maximizing small
discrepancies perceived between expectation and actual occur
rence

(Maddi, 1968).

That is, McClelland

(1951)

suggested

that the individual desires a certain degree of predictability
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and control, but not so much as to preclude novelty and
spontaneity.

The former situation in excess would lead to

boredom, while the latter in excess would bring about psycho
logical chaos.
Resistance to changes in behavior is viewed in terms of
an individual's desire to maintain optimal consistency
between expectations and realizations.

Accordingly,

anxiety

signals the individual's fear that the perceived ability to
maintain cognitive control over events is being diminished.
By applying cognitive balance procedures as suggested by
Festinger
rists,

(1958) , Heider

(1958) , and other "balance" theo

such anxiety is reduced.

In essence, persons must

restructure their system of expectations to accommodate dis
crepant outcomes,

and/or they must deny or distort the per

ception of actual events which are discrepant from those
expected,

to retain the accuracy or validity of such

expectations.
Thus, an individual tends to persist or resist change in
those behaviors and modes of perceiving events which serve to
maintain optimal cognitive balance.

This locus or source of

resistance seems to be similar to that suggested by Adler
(1963), Horney

(1945) , Rogers

(1961), and Sullivan

(1953).

Past experiences provide the system of cognitive precepts
from which one defines his/her relationship to certain
objects, and one's present experiences occur within this preestablished system.

This provides one with a frame of
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reference for appraising one's psychological significance or
power

(i.e., self-esteem or self-worth).

Thus, resistance •

according to Paradigm III represents the individual's attempt
to retain the basis for certain cognitive precepts which lead
to such feelings of significance and esteem within actual,
ongoing interactions.

Critical Evaluation of the Three
Existing Paradigms of Resistance
All three existing paradigms indicate that there is a
process whereby an individual tends to repeat behavior.
Paradigm I denotes the "repetition compulsion," Paradigm II
speaks of one's "behavioral repertoire," and the concepts of
"life style" and "self-concept" are the analogous constructs
in Paradigm III.

However,

the process which underlies the

tendency to maintain certain patterns of behavior is explained
differently by each of these paradigms,

and it relates to the

nature of the theoretical relationship between past and pres
ent experiences which is promulgated by each of these para
digms of resistance to behavior change.
Paradigm I places the locus of resistance to behavior
change within one's past experiences.

The relationship

between past and present life experiences is one in which the
individual's early object relationships are revivified in
his/her present life circumstances.

Present patterns of

behavior are understood primarily in terms of these past,
early life experiences,

and not so much in terms of present
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or future concerns.

Moreover, psychoanalytic theory assumes

that this process of repeating behavior is an unconscious
one, and, thus, by definition the person has no capacity to
alter the operations of resistance as long as the process
remains unconscious.
This view suggests that the person is a "victim" of cir
cumstances.

Persons are viewed as not having the capacity to

generate their present circumstances.

On the other hand, an

alternative view suggests that persons have the capacity to
be selective in applying the transference phenomenon and that
transference does not occur automatically, only by passive
volition.

If one adopts this alternative view, the persis

tence of patterns of behavior can be understood as a function
of a person's choice to repeat such patterns.

Many of the

theorists who began diverging from Freud could not maintain
the view that one's present behavior can be sufficiently
understood in terms of historic artifact.
(cited in Jacobi,

1951; Munroe,

For example, Jung

1955) perceived that the sym

bols and dream work are reflections of one's present and
future concerns.

According to Jung, even if the symbols

refer to the past and the archaic, their appearance signals
a functional relationship between this past and the presentlife circumstances.
Dreikurs,

Similarly, Adler

(cited in Mosak &

1973) viewed that an individual's defense mechan

isms reflect a wish to maintain self-esteem within the
present demands of living.

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n o f th e copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

27
S. Freud

(1924) assumed that psychological defenses are

established in response to an initial source of anxiety and
are maintained because one unconsciously revivifies this
initial source within present object relations.

For example,

a man who exhibits hostility towards his wife is unconsciously
acting out his hostility towards his mother via the transfer
ence phenomenon.

One important phenomenon not emphasized by

Freud, however, is the experience of negative outcomes in
object relations which produce anxiety.

This experience not

only signals a fear concerned with the immediate situation,
but, in addition, the anxiety is associated with an individ
ual's future concerns as to the ability to achieve the
desired outcomes in future object relations.

For example, a

child is not only threatened by the immediate loss of a pri
mary dependency object, but is also threatened by the impli
cation that he/she does not have the ability to impact on
such objects in such a way as to ensure fulfillment of
dependency needs in the future.

That is, the child fails to

acquire sufficient reassurance that he/she has the capacity
to be lovable and special enough to be mothered.
Therefore, one of the major deficiencies with the con
cept of resistance in Paradigm I is the absence of the notion
that certain reassurance or confidence not received in early
object relations in the past affects one's present interac
tions with other objects.

Even though an individual's his

toric or initial sources of infantile anxieties no longer
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operate in the present circumstances, the prospective impli
cations derived from these initial sources may remain.

The

man who grew up feeling insecure about his ability to elicit
approval and nurturing from his mother may develop a hostile,
defensive posture toward his wife.

This posture results not

because he is merely revivifying unconsciously his relation
ship with his mother, but because he lacks the reassurance
that he has the ability to meet adequately the expectations
of a woman.
Paradigm I denotes that the locus of resistance is
within past experiences.

In this recent example,

it would be

presumed that by revealing to this man his unconscious desire
to defend against his mother's rejection and to punish her,
the transference of these feelings toward his wife may be
altered.

However,

the proposal here is that the content

transferred from his relation with his mother to his wife is
his lack of confidence or reassurance in his ability to
impact sufficiently upon a woman.

Moreover, his resistance

to relinquishing the hostile patterns of behavior centers
around his desire to have such confidence reinstated by his
wife but, at the same time, a desire to avoid outcomes which
would reinforce his lack of confidence.

Thus, Paradigm I

fails to recognize that persons are often attempting to seek
certain reassurances in their present object relations to
compensate for a lack of such reassurances from past object
relations.

An individual often accounts for a particular
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pattern of behavior or trait by specifying the historic
source or genesis of the behavior but still resists relin
quishing or altering such behavior.

Persons frequently

exploit their past to rationalize or justify a given behav
ior when,

in actuality,

such persistence serves present and

future concerns, apart from the past.
Both Paradigms I and II tend to view individuals as pas
sive reactants to internal and external stimuli, having
little or no control over the circumstances to which they
must be responsive.

In Paradigm I the individual is pre

sented as an unwitting "victim" of unconscious trends of
behavior which issue from early, past experiences.

In Para

digm II, the assumption is that individuals are respondents
to environmental conditions and that their behavior is
"shaped" by its consequences within these conditions.

This

paradigm emphasizes a locus of resistance which is primarily
oriented toward adapting to present conditions.
Several major theoretical factors suggest that the pri
mary locus of resistance is not confined within one's actual,
present circumstances of living.

First, learning theorists

seem to neglect the proposition that one often tends to seek
out the conditions or stimuli which will reinforce a particu
lar pattern of behavior.

Generally, theorists identified

with Paradigm II presume that one is responsive to a given
set of stimuli, and the effects of that response tend to
either reinforce the strength of the response or weaken it.
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However, the contention here is that persons have the capa
city and desire to generate their own consequences and have
the ability to seek out consequences which will maintain a
particular desired response set.

For example, a person who

wishes to maintain his/her dependence on alcohol may generate
the occurrence of stimuli which reinforce alcohol consumption,
even when such stimuli are currently absent.
may instigate an argument,

Such persons

for instance, with their spouses

in order to generate anger and anxiety, and subsequently pro
ceed to drink as a means of reducing the impact of these
feelings.

An obese individual who is resistant to losing

weight may consciously or unconsciously generate the circum
stances in which the temptation to eat is present

(e.g.,

driving by the ice cream parlor or generating a "crisis" to
precipitate anxious worrying, etc.).
The implication is that there often exists a motiva
tional aspect underlying a particular pattern of behavior in
which persons generate their own condition of reinforcement.
Altering the consequences of such a pattern does not neces
sarily remove the motivational factor, and persons are likely
again to generate their own contingencies of reinforcement.
A child who wishes to be disruptive in school in order to
avoid his/her frustration with academic performance may do
so not because the consequences of disruption are reinforcing,
but because the child would rather be a "behavior problem"
than a "stupid child."
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A second major factor overlooked in Paradigm II is that
one can generate contingencies of reinforcement in fantasy
behavior.

Through fantasy behavior,

an individual has the

capacity to reinforce a particular thought or behavior trend
by generating fantasy outcomes rather than experiencing
actual ones.

In its more extreme forms, this capacity is

manifested in psychotic disorders.

Thus,

fantasy is an

important channel for experiencing outcomes, but one which is
overlooked by most learning theorists.
If individuals can choose and generate the sources of
reinforcement for a particular trend of behavior which they
desire to maintain, then persons will tend to discount stim
uli which do not serve to reinforce the behavior.

In effect,

the concept of using stimulus control as a means of counter
acting resistance fails to consider the notion that persons
already have the capacity for maintaining stimulus control.
Therefore, one must presume that there exists another source
of resistance beyond the immediate consequences associated
with particular behavior patterns.
It could be stipulated that maintaining stimulus control
is effective in altering behavior, but only to the extent
that such control is imposed and regulated over a "captive"
individual.

For example, it is interesting to note that

residents within institutional environments, such as prisons
and other detention facilities, often demonstrate marked
changes in behavior within the stimulus controls of the
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institution but revert to previous trends outside of the
institution.

The implication is that because persons have

the capacity or freedom to select the conditions to which
they must be responsive, they can selectively generate their
own sources of reinforcement for a particular behavior
pattern.
Paradigms I and II tend to complement each other due to
their contrasting views on the sources of resistance to
behavior change.

Paradigm I presumes that the impact of

one's past experiences must be altered in order for one to
relinquish certain modes of behavior.

Paradigm II suggests

that while past experiences determine how one will respond
to one's present circumstances, it is the outcomes derived
from present experience which are related to resistance.
Proponents of the former view tend to be critical of the
latter because of the assumption that, unless one's past
experiences are redefined, one will continue to transfer past,
infantile trends to present behavior.

Proponents of the lat

ter, on the other hand, point to the idea that the former
approach fails to recognize that persons are responding to
their present life demands and that behavior must have util
ity in relation to their present circumstances,

apart from

historic determinants.
An alternative perspective is that each of these views
is partially valid, and, by combining both approaches,
accurate concept of resistance is achieved.

a more

Such a
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perspective is reflected in Paradigm III.

Paradigm III

designates the locus of resistance to behavior change within
the interactional process between past and present experi
ences.

As such, this paradigm emphasizes the theoretical

viewpoint expressed by Lewin's

(19 35)

field theory.

Lewin

stated that an individual's behavior in a particular situa
tion is determined both by the characteristics of that situa
tion,

as he/she views them, and by the particular dispositions

of the person at that time.
The implication of Lewin's statement is expressed by
other theorists identified with Paradigm III.

That is, there

exists an interdependent relationship between past and pres
ent experiences.

According to this view, the locus of resis

tance is not confined to the revivification of past experi
ences , as contended in Paradigm I, but it extends to the
implications that such experiences have in relation to pres
ent life demands.

At the same time, this view also implies

that the locus of resistance is not confined to the nature of
the outcomes in one's present conditions, as suggested in
Paradigm II, but it extends to the nature of how one's past
experiences delimit one's mode of perceiving present condi
tions.

Thus, resistance to behavior change is not always an

expression of the absence of certain reinforcing conditions,
but it frequently reflects a person's unwillingness to permit
the experience of such conditions.
The view of this paper is that Paradigm III represents
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the most accurate or valid concept of resistance among the
existing three paradigms.

It emphasizes the point that an

individual derives a system of interacting with certain
objects from past experiences as does Paradigm I.

However,

Paradigm III also notes that behavior is not merely perpetu
ated by the unconscious existence of its historic determi
nants, that is, infantile sources of anxiety, but is
perpetuated by the implications that such experiences have in
regard to the nature of immediate outcomes.

Consequently,

the locus of resistance is not confined to the psychological
significance of historic, past experience, but it extends to
the psychological significance of one's present conditions of
life.
Paradigm III indicates that past experiences tend to
generate the system of precepts of what one's relationship L >
the world should be, and that from present experiences one
derives the precept of how one ijs relating to the world.
Persons tend to resist changes in patterned behavior which
would alter their precept of what they are in relation to
certain objects when such a precept generates incongruence
between what they are and what they should be.
as Adler

(cited in Mosak & Dreikurs, 1973)

For example,

indicated, a man

might develop certain traits of a "masculine" life style
because he thinks,

"I should be masculine."

Much of his

self-esteem relies upon maintaining congruence between his
cognitive precepts:

"I should be masculine," and "I am
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masculine."
Adler might suggest that this individual has derived
this precept from past experiences in which the traits of
masculinity may have been denoted as being physically strong,
intrepid, and indifferent to attaining emotional nurturing.
By exhibiting such traits in relation to certain objects, the
individual presumes that he will achieve approval and accep
tance from certain others.

"I should be masculine" develops

into an expectation that a masculine life style will lead to
acquiring and maintaining self-esteem, and this individual
attempts to structure his behavior toward fulfilling such
life-style goals.

If he begins to experience such feelings

as fear or dependency anxiety in relation to certain objects,
then his self-esteem tends to be threatened.
Resistance to relinquishing or altering this individ
ual's "masculine" behavior is a function of the interactional
process between his past and present experiences.

It is his

past experience which has provided the structure for develop
ing his masculine life-style goals, representing what his
relationship should be to certain objects,
tion.

in a given situa

It is his present experiences which serve as the frame

of reference for appraising whether he is as masculine as he
should be.

The interaction is such that he tends to persist

in attempting to exhibit masculine traits as long as he main
tains the cognitive precept that this is what he should be in
order to achieve psychological significance

(i.e.,
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self-esteem or self-worth).

Thus, according to Paradigm III,

it is difficult for one to change what one iss doing unless
one can change what one believes he/she should be doing.
Again, the former is related to what one is presently experi
encing in interactions with objects, and the latter is
derived from one's past experiences.
In essence, Paradigm III theorists assume that in order
to counteract the resistance which is a product of the inter
dependent relationship between past and present experiences,
a process of "reeducation" must occur.

The focus of this

process seems to be on the person's cognitive system of
expectations which have been derived from formative, past
experiences.

That is, it involves an attempt to restructure

life-style goals or the preconceived relation to objects
which the individual has adopted as an injunction based on
past experience.

However, the process tends to occur in

relation to the individual's ongoing interactions,

in con

trast to the psychoanalytic focus on the person's early, past
relations with objects.

Thus, resistance to behavior change

is viewed as the persistence of certain cognitive precepts,
and psychotherapy is viewed as a process which is undertaken
as a means of attempting to provide the client with alterna
tive cognitive precepts.

By altering the client's concept of

what he/she should be in relation to the world, the client is
more "free" to pursue alternative life-style goals and still
retain self-esteem.
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An alternative theoretical paradigm is presented in the
next section.

In theory, it more closely resembles Paradigm

III than either of the other paradigms of resistance to
behavior change.

However,

this alternative paradigm, Para

digm IV, diverges from III by adopting the following proposi
tion.

While Paradigm III assumes that persons strive toward

maintaining congruence between what they are and what they
should be, Paradigm IV proposes that persons strive to main
tain congruence between what persons perceive they a r e , and
what they can be.

Thus, the emphasis is on competence of

behavioral performance rather than on the issues of ethicalmoral or value-based obligations to perform behavior in a
particular way.
This theoretical distinction alters the locus of resis
tance to behavior change from that suggested by Paradigm III.
What one "should be" is derived from past experiences, but
what one "can be" is derived from one's precepts of future or
potential experience.

Consequently, Paradigm IV designates

the primary locus of resistance as the interactional process
between present and future experience rather than between
past and present experience.

The basis for this theoretical

distinction is explained in the following section.
Paradigm IV: An Alternative
Concept of Resistance
An alternative paradigm of resistance is represented
as follows:
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Paradigm IV:

Past ----- ^ Future'll'

^ iPresent

Like Paradigm III, this alternative paradigm assumes
that one strives toward establishing and maintaining a posi
tion of psychological significance in relation to certain
objects.

Such a position permits individuals to feel that

they have sufficient impact upon such objects in order to
derive the desired outcomes from interactions with them.

As

indicated previously, Adler

(1963), Horney

(1961), and Sullivan

suggested that having a precon

(1953)

(1945), Rogers

ceived position of regard, esteem, or worth in relation to
the world provides one with a feeling of security and control
which mitigates against the feelings of vulnerability and
helplessness.
Paradigm IV also concurs with the notion that a person
attempts to construct a "cognitive map" of the world.

The

individual attempts to develop a system of cognitive plans
or expectations for relating to various objects in particular
situations.
ences.

Such expectations are derived from past experi

However, Paradigm IV begins to diverge from III at

this point.

Paradigm IV proposes that while a person seeks

to establish a system of cognitive plans or expectations
relating to establishing a position of psychological signif
icance, the focus of concern becomes centered around the
extent to which the person remains confident that he/she has
the ability to execute these cognitive plans.

That is, while

persons may know what kinds of positions they wish to
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establish and maintain to achieve security, the issue that
remains is whether they can achieve those positions.
Using this line of reasoning, anxiety represents a
threat to persons'

precepts of their capacity to achieve

desired relationships to certain objects.

Resistance to

behavior change represents their unwillingness to risk
encountering a threat to their perceived capacity.

That is,

as long as persons perceive that they have the ability to
execute particular cognitive plans or expectations to estab
lish positions of significance, they can maintain a feeling
of psychological security.

Thus, according to Paradigm IV,

behavior patterns do not reflect a person's attempt to exe
cute a particular life style, but an attempt to maintain the
precept of his/her capacity to execute a particular life
style.
In Paradigm IV, the primary locus of resistance is
between future and present experiences.

The precept "I will

be able to execute my plan or expectation for achieving a
position of psychological significance" is an expression of
a hope, a future wish.

As such,

the perceived ability to

execute a cognitive plan remains an expectation which is
expressed in fantasy.

The expectation remains viable or

valid in fantasy to the extent that its validity is not
threatened by actual experiences.

For example, the expecta

tion expressed in fantasy that "I have the ability to be
sexually attractive to the opposite sex" remains viable to
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the extent that when this ability is "tested out" in actual
interactions

(not in fantasy b e h a vior), the resultant out

comes verify or validate the fantasied ability.
the interaction between persons'

Consequently,

future experiences as

expressed in fantasy and their present experiences as expressed
in ongoing actual behavior provides them with the frame of
reference for appraising their sense of security or self
esteem according to Paradigm IV.
Individuals adopt a kind of scientific approach to ren
dering meaning and implications to the outcomes which they
experience.

According to this alternative paradigm of resis

tance, the experience of particular outcomes,

in and of them

selves, does not affect the perception of self.
affect individuals'

What does

perceptions of their ability to achieve

psychological significance is the degree of external validity
they assign to particular outcomes.

For example,

a student

who receives failing results on an examination may become
extremely anxious because this outcome invalidates the stu
dent's perceived ability to be academically successful.
ever,

How

if the student minimizes the significance of this

particular outcome, he/she decreases its negative implica
tions so that it does not invalidate the perceived ability to
be academically successful.

For instance,

"I failed this

examination because I did not study enough for it" discounts
the significance that this negative outcome has on the stu
dent's fantasies of having the capacity to be academically

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n of th e cop yrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

41
successful.

That is, the following belief,

"If I had really

tried to achieve good results on that examination,

I would

have been able to do so," is a precept whose adoption permits
this individual to retain the perceived ability to be aca
demically successful in spite of the discrepant outcome just
experienced.
Thus, individuals adopt a pseudoscientific posture in
regard to the implications of outcomes which are experienced.
Like a law of physics,

an outcome which appears to invalidate

a particular law of nature can be dismissed to the extent
that it is viewed as being produced from faulty or nonideal
conditions.

In an analogous fashion, an individual can dis

count a "negative" or invalidating outcome by determining the
existence of a flaw within the circumstances in which the
outcome occurred.

Applying this line of reasoning, Paradigm

IV assumes that the primary locus of resistance to behavior
change is within the interaction of future experiences and
present ones.

The expectation to fulfill one's abilities and

achieve certain outcomes remains viable even in the light of
the experience of actual discrepant outcomes to the extent
that the external validity of these discrepant outcomes can
be discounted.
Dismissing or discounting the significance of the impli
cations of actual outcomes is central to the concept of
resistance represented by Paradigm IV.

Persons protect their

expectations of their capacity to attain certain outcomes
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that lead to a perceived position of psychological signifi
cance by structuring present conditions in such a way as to
make it feasible to discount discrepant outcomes, to provide
them with a kind of psychological "slack."
one is of achieving non-discrepant

The less assured

(invalidating) outcomes,

the more psychological slack one tends to require.
A related approach to understanding this concept of dis
counting the external validity of an actual outcome is the
notion that one tends to introduce a "fail-safe system" into
one's interactions with objects.

A fail-safe system is a

perceived set of flaws in the conditions in which behavior
occurs so that the failure to achieve certain desired out
comes can be attributed to the existence of these flaws,
rather than invalidating a person's perceived abilities them
selves.

Such fail-safe factors provide one with the degree

of psychological slack needed when one is putting a fantasied
ability to the "test" of reality.

The particular kinds of

flaws utilized as fail-safe factors can be applied to the
person within a given situation,

and/or applied to the condi

tions or objects in that situation.
are physical ailments,

Examples of the former

fatigue, apathy, and antisocial or

characterological traits.

These permit individuals to expe

rience outcomes which would undermine their fantasied abil
ities to produce the desired outcomes if it were not for the
existence of these fail-safe factors.

For instance,

a person

who fears an impending rejection by another might behave in
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such a way as to justify such rejection.

The person might

begin to interact in ways which typically elicit disapproval
and rejection so that if and when it occurs,

it can be viewed

as a result of the person not really "trying" to be accepted
or loved, rather than an absence of the capacity to be
lovable and held in esteem by another.
Fail-safe factors can also be applied to other objects
or conditions whereby undesirable outcomes are reconciled by
the perceived existence of inadequate or nonideal conditions.
For example, a tennis player may use a poorly constructed
racket as a potential fail-safe factor to account for occa
sions of poor performance on the tennis court.

A woman might

seek out a hostile, rejecting kind of man as a husband in
order to provide a potential fail-safe factor for certain
outcomes which would otherwise threaten her fantasied abil
ities to be an "adequate" wife.
According to Paradigm IV, resistance is not so much an
expression of one's desire to avoid conflicting life-style
goals, as suggested by Paradigm III, as it is an expression
of one's need to protect the perception of the ability to
achieve such life-style goals.

Thus, it is suggested that

the persistence of certain behavior patterns does not reflect
an attempt to achieve an expectation, as it is to protect
one's perception of the capacity to achieve it.
Paradigm IV is the theoretical base for a model of
resistance to behavior change which has the following
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implications with regard to the existing concepts of resis
tance.

First, past object relations not only provide indi

viduals with information as to what kinds of positions they
must achieve in relation to certain objects, but, in addi
tion, these relationships convey to the individual how suc
cessful they are at achieving such positions.

Parental

figures directly or indirectly set up expectations and
demands for individuals but frequently fail to provide ade
quate reassurance to individuals that they have the ability
to meet them.

For instance,

a child tends to experience

anxiety when a parental figure is rejecting him/her.

However,

the anxiety not only relates to the child's immediate concern
of being unable to maintain an adequate position to be lov
able and acceptable, but there is the anxiety generated from
the perceived threat that the child does not have the capa
city to be lovable and acceptable in the future.

This latter

threat can only be defused by experiencing present or future
outcomes which reinstate the individual's confidence and
assurance in this ability.
Many theorists neglect the proposition that early
sources of anxiety are not just perpetuated by historic arti
facts, but continue to be real, ongoing fears in relation to
present and future interactions with certain objects.

Cer

tain reassurances not received in the past can only be
instilled as a function of experiencing present or future
outcomes which serve to reinstate confidence in spite of the
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past.

In line with such reasoning, resistance to relinquish

ing psychological defenses relates to present and future con
cerns,

and not to those of the past.

The experience of hurt

and pain in the past has great significance only to the
extent to which one is not reassured of one's ability to
avoid it in the future.
Furthermore,

behavior patterns, or one's apparent life

style, do not necessarily reflect one's expectations, values,
or goals.

The contention here is that individuals'

expressed

values and actions frequently are a means of justifying their
avoidance trend from attempting to seek validation of a fantasied ability.

For example, persons who adopt the value

that material wealth is not important to them may,

in fact,

maintain this value as a means of justifying an avoidance
of an attempt to demonstrate the ability to achieve financial
security.

In a sense, this is a kind of reaction formation

defense, but it is not a defense against unacceptable urges
or impulses.

Instead,

it is a defense against risking a

threat to one's fantasied abilities.
Thus, the expression of certain personal values,
tudes, and preferences often serves an individuals'
justify what actually is an avoidance trend.

atti

desire to

The individual

who does not "believe" in violence is often an individual who
is fearful that he/she may not have the ability to be physi
cally dominant over another.

Another person who expresses no

"interest" in active participation in athletics is often a
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person who is fearful of destroying the fantasy that if the
person really wanted to demonstrate athletic prowess, he/she
could.

The proposition maintained in Paradigm IV disputes

the maxim which suggests that "one is good at the things one
likes."

Instead,

it is the contention here that "one likes

what one is good at."

The implication is that one's cogni

tive system of expressed values and precepts is not main
tained merely as a function of parental influence, but that
the person also chooses to persist in these to rationalize
a particular mode of behavior or emotional reaction which
underwrites fail-safe features in actual interactions.

Thus,

the persistence of feelings and actions based upon an adopted
belief system may not be a function of maintaining the belief
system, but rather that the belief system justifies the feel
ings and actions which the person wishes to maintain for
self-serving purposes.
The theoretical model based upon Paradigm IV also sug
gests that such terms as m a s o chism, self-punishment, selfdefeating behavior, and maladaptive behavior are misnomers
for describing certain behavior patterns.

The alternative

model presents the view that behavior which appears to be
self-destructive or self-defeating is in actuality selfserving behavior with regard to the individual's self-esteem.
Such behavior patterns serve to protect the validity of one's
fantasies of certain abilities and powers in the face of
actual threats to their validity.

Many existing theoretical
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approaches are based upon elucidating for clients how they
are behaving in self-defeating or self-destructive manners
and, consequently, how they are generating anxiety and
depression within themselves.

This pattern is instead estab

lished by clients as a means of providing fail-safe features
to dismiss or defuse the threat of certain recent or antici
pated outcomes.

Therefore,

for the client, awareness that

certain behaviors are self-defeating or self-destructive does
not undermine the desire to persist in them since,
client, they are self-serving.

for the

The concept of masochistic

behavior is rejected by Paradigm IV.

Behavior trends

observed by others are only self-destructive because others
project their own feelings of self or relate to them as such.
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CHAPTER II
The Fail-Safe Theoretical Model of
Resistance to Behavior Change
The proposed theoretical model developed in this chapter
reflects the features represented by Paradigm IV.

Like the

existing three general paradigms, Paradigm IV imparts signif
icance to past experiences as determinants of behavior.

How

ever, according to the concept reflected in this alternative
paradigm,

the process of resistance itself occurs in relation

to an interdependency between present and future
in fantasy)

experience.

(as depicted

That is, certain modes of behavior

may be initiated as a function of past experiences, but their
persistence, according to Paradigm IV, indicates an attempt
to negotiate psychologically between present experiences and
fantasied,

future experiences.

The presumed nature of this

interdependent relationship provides the central issues which
comprise the proposed theoretical model.
In initiating the presentation,

the following section

introduces what is considered to be a core tendency or a pri
mary striving underlying personality development and func
tioning.
Psychological Security: Ability
to Be Significant in O n e 's World
The abilities to be special, unique, and lovable are
very much associated with a person's capacity to achieve
48
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positions of significance in relation to others.

In order to

establish and maintain a position of significance or regard
in relation to another, an individual must compete with other
persons as well as other things.

A child who wishes to

occupy a strong position of significance in relation to the
mothering one must compete with siblings, perhaps with
another parental figure, and other potential sources of
interest and gratification which the mothering one could pur
sue.

Somehow the child must be able to assert its presence,

to have a special sense of significance or impact, in such a
way as to compete effectively with these alternative objects
and events.

In other situations, a spouse competes, directly

or indirectly, with other potential,

alternative sources of

gratification for the special position of significance in
relation to the other spouse.

Generalizing this concept,

individuals compete for such a position among peers and
within other social constellations.
To maintain a strong position of significance to certain
objects is to ensure that these objects remain reliable and
accessible sources for gratifying certain biological and psy
chological needs.

Adler's

(1964)

concept that one strives

for esteem within one's social constellations
peer groups)

(i.e., family,

at least implicitly underwrites this theoretical

proposition.
As suggested in the previous section, those figures for
which a person desires to establish such a position tend to
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generate,

implicitly or otherwise, expectations and standards

of performance which become prerequisite conditions for
acquiring certain degrees of significance in relation to
them.

Perhaps contrary to Rogers'

(1961) presumption,

a

position of being loved and special to another is conditional,
even though the conditions often remain unspoken.

An indi

vidual must realize that there exist particular attributes
such as intelligence,

athletic prowess, physical attractive

ness, poise and charm, socioeconomic status,

appropriate

gender-role performance, and so on, which factor in the proc
ess of acquiring significance and impact.

Depending upon the

relative importance rendered to certain attributes by a par
ticular figure, one's ability to achieve such a position in
relation to that figure rests on one's ability to demonstrate
these attributes adequately.
Integrating this notion into the theoretical frame of
the proposed model, the perceived ability to establish and
maintain a desired position of significance to certain objects
corresponds to one's degree of "psychological security."
This concept of psychological security as a core striving
underlying personality development, as suggested earlier,

is

similar to Adler's concept of striving for "self-esteem."
However, Adler and other theorists with similar theoretical
views presumed that self-esteem or self-worth is defined by
adopting and identifying with a particular life style or con
cept of self.

However, the proposed theoretical model begins
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to diverge at this point.

The proposed model is based on the

idea that a person's self-appraisal is defined by that per
son's perceived ability to execute certain life-style patterns
or kinds of interactions with the world.
sufficient

(but necessary)

That is, it is not

that persons have a cognitive "map"

or system for attaining esteem and regard in relation to
others, but, in addition, their sense of psychological worth
rests in their confidence to execute or implement such a sys
tem.

Thus, Adler viewed behavior as reflecting persons'

con

cepts of how they should relate to certain others to achieve
a position of significance.

However, the proposed model

views ongoing patterns of behavior as representing individ
uals'

attempts to preserve the precept that they can relate

to certain others to achieve a position of significance.
"Should I be . . .

" involves a decision of selecting among

alternative ways of dealing with particular situations.
"Should" delimits the issue of concern to selecting the most
effective mode of interaction perceived by the individual,
a given situation.

"Can I be . . .

in

" extends the issue of

concern beyond which mode of interaction would be the most
propitious in a given situation to whether the .individual
perceives the ability to implement or execute effectively a
particular mode of interaction, apart from the issue of
whether that particular mode is desired by the individual.
Consequently,

the proposed model conceptualizes the per

sistence of certain behavior patterns as underlying an attempt
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on the part of individuals to preserve certain selfassurances that they can be significant in relation to
others, even if this desired level of significance has not
been or is not being demonstrated in interactions with cer
tain objects-

It is assumed that one's psychological

security rests on maintaining such a precept.
The following section introduces the concept that
maintaining psychological security involves a process of
acquiring ongoing reassurance of one's ability to achieve
significance to certain objects by experiencing outcomes
which demonstrate such ability.

Outcomes which enhance an

individual's psychological security shall be termed positive
outcomes.

Those which undermine or threaten one's psycholog

ical security shall be referred to as negative outcomes.

It

is proposed that persons have two dimensions in which to
experience outcomes and that there is an interdependent rela
tionship between these two dimensions.

Actual and Fantasy Interactions: Two
Interdependent Dimensions of Experience
In general, the existing three paradigms as presented in
Chapter II reflect the view that behavior represents the
result of persons attempting to negotiate, psychologically,
past experiences with ongoing experiences.

The proposed

model, based on the concept related in Paradigm IV, suggests
that the locus of such negotiation is between future experi
ences

(as generated in fantasy)

and actual, ongoing
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circumstances of living.

Upon this theoretical distinction

rests the concept that a primary direction or focus of behav
ior is toward maintaining the capacity to generate psycho
logical security from fantasied,

future outcomes, when

threats incurred as a function of negative outcomes are
experienced within actual, ongoing conditions.
What is being proposed within this theroetical model is
that a person maintains psychological security through two
interdependent dimensions of experience:
interactions and fantasied,

actual, ongoing

future interactions.

That is,

individuals maintain two dimensions in which to test out and
acquire assurances of their abilities to be significant and
to have impact in relation to certain objects.
The model assumes that there is a fluid, ongoing system
of dynamics between these two dimensions of experience which
maximizes psychological security.

The concept of resistance

rendered by the model involves explanations of how and why
persons "shift" from one dimension to the other.

The shift

ing phenomenon which shall be examined in further discussion
is apparent when one speaks of altered states of conscious
ness.

It is as if there were an ongoing process of selec

tively attending to sources of stimulation provided by actual
events and objects and, under certain conditions,

a shift

occurring in the focus of experience toward stimulation
provided by fantasied events and objects.
A person's capacity to maintain an adequate level of
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psychological security corresponds to the person's ability
to generate ongoing assurances of having sufficient impact
and significance to certain others.
of such assurances

In the relative absence

(i.e., positive outcomes)

arising within

an individual's actual, ongoing conditions, the individual
shifts from these conditions to the dimension of fantasied
experiences which compensate or substitute for the absence
of such assurances within the present,

actual circumstances.

A compensatory function is intended when one attempts to
shift from where one "really" is to where one will be or
could be as depicted in daydreaming.

At times, the shifting

from one dimension to the other is partial rather than com
plete.

For instance, an individual might elaborate or super

impose fantasied aspects upon actual experiences so that the
outcomes experienced by the individual are enhanced as being
more positive.

In this manner, persons utilize partial

shifts to transpose what would otherwise be experienced as
mundane and uneventful interactions into experiences which
bespeak their impact and significance to certain objects.
Beyond such partial shifting, persons generate shifts from
one dimension to the other so that they can perceive actual,
ongoing experiences as relatively inconsequential and rely
primarily upon outcomes generated from fantasy experiences.
The process involved in shifting between the two dimensions
of experience to maximize psychological security, at a given
point in time,

is explicated in the following discussion.
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Dynamics Underlying Shifting;
Maintaining Cognitive Control
Over the Validity of Outcomes
The model denotes a system of dynamics that are involved
in the process of shifting between the two dimensions of
experience which is necessary if the process is to serve its
compensatory function.

A shift from actual ongoing condi

tions to the future fantasied dimension does not automati
cally, in and of itself, enhance psychological security.
Fantasies must retain sufficient plausibility or validity for
them to enhance one's level of psychological security.

Suf

ficient validity is maintained to the extent that individuals
are capable of reconciling large discrepancies between fan
tasied performance abilities and the level of performance
reflected by the outcomes within their actual, ongoing inter
actions with objects.

This prerequisite condition is par

ticularly relevant in cases where a person has been experienc
ing negative outcomes in certain actual experiences but
wishes to maintain the validity of fantasies which depict the
capacity to achieve positive outcomes relative to this
particular domain of interaction.
In order to reconcile the discrepancies between the two
dimensions of outcomes experienced by an individual, the
individual tends to discount the validity of actual outcomes
which are discrepant from those generated in fantasied future
experiences.

The "degree of validity" assigned to a particu

lar outcome is defined as the extent to which one perceives
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that outcome as reflecting one's true performance ability.
Like the laws of nature,
conditions,

only under certain adequate or ideal

the laws will hold true.

However, even in the

case when a particular outcome is discrepant from that pre
dicted by certain laws of nature,

if it is perceived as

resulting from inappropriate or inadequate conditions, then
the law retains its validity in spite of the discrepant out
come.

In an analogous fashion, outcomes resulting from

interactions with objects need not always be valid or accu
rate indicators of the degree of significance one can have in
relation to such objects,

if the conditions or circumstances

in which these interactions occurred were flawed or inade
quate.

For example,

it is generally accepted that when an

individual is temporarily debilitated or incapacitated by
illness,

the individual's level of performance during such a

period is not a true reflection of the individual's perfor
mance capabilities.
In order to facilitate the compensatory function of the
shifting process to maximize psychological security, one
strives to maintain cognitive control over assigning the
varying degrees of validity to outcomes.

As long as a person

is able to perceive flaws or inadequacies in actual, ongoing
conditions,

then the person remains prepared to shift toward

a fantasied future dimension of experiencing positive out
comes when such outcomes do not occur in actual conditions.
The student who maintains faulty study habits may utilize
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this condition cognitively to account for poor academic per
formances.

When such poor performances are demonstrated, the

student can counteract the potential threat to psychological
security by shifting to fantasied future experiences.

These

depict that in the future, the person can prove that under
the proper conditions

(i.e., sufficient studying), academic

success can be achieved.
Thus, not only does the nature of a particular outcome
(positive or negative)
in addition,

affect psychological security, but,

it is affected by the degree of validity that

one assigns to the outcome.

This concept may be expressed

as follows:
Psychological _
In the recent example,

(Outcome X Assigned Validity).
in order for the student to counteract

the threat of negative outcomes in actual interactions by
shifting to fantasied,

future outcomes, the student must be

able to discount the perceived validity of the actual ones
while assigning validity to those generated in fantasy.
Thus, the capacity to exert sufficient cognitive control
in assigning validity to outcomes is central to one's ability
to shift from one dimension to the other dimension of experi
encing outcomes and maximizing psychological security.

When

persons do not derive sufficient assurances of their inter
personal impact and significance within their actual, ongoing
conditions,

and they are able to discount the validity of

this occurrence, then they can shift toward generating
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fantasied,

future experiences.

On the other hand, when

actual, ongoing conditions do provide an adequate source of
positive outcomes, persons can assign validity to these out
comes, and withdraw their reliance on the fantasy dimension
during such periods.
Therefore, being able to assign or discount selectively
the validity of outcomes is a crucial factor in permitting
the person to maintain enough psychological flexibility to
shift effectively from one dimension of experience to the
other.

Within the framework of the model, this flexibility

is termed psychological slack.

While individuals seek reas

surances in their actual life conditions to enhance psycho
logical security, persons, at the same time, also wish to
defend against the risk of being vulnerable to threats to
psychological security that might occur in the process.

One

is more apt to undertake this risk factor when one or both of
the following conditions are perceived:

(1) the person's

past experiences have generated enough confidence in a given
area of performance to minimize the perceived level of risk
of incurring negative outcomes during an anticipated perfor
mance in actual, ongoing interactions; and/or

(2) the person

is able to maintain enough psychological slack to reconcile
cognitively the occurrence of negative outcomes, even if
these are encountered.
The proposed model reflects the view that the persis
tence of behavior patterns

(i.e., beliefs, moods, and
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actions)

signals their use in providing the levels of psycho

logical slack desired by the person to maintain cognitive
control in assigning validity to outcomes.

In a sense, psy

chological slack permits one to build a fail- safe system into
one's actual conditions of performance.
The concept of resistance presented by this model is
based upon the notion that individuals tend to be resistant
to relinquishing those behaviors or predispositions which
provide them with psychological slack and a fail-safe system
for interacting with actual objects.

There is often a para

doxical situation involved in one's attempt to maximize one's
level of psychological security.

That is, reassurance is

needed most when self-doubt exists.

At the same time,

the

more self-doubt there is, the less one has confidence in the
ability to acquire such reassurance.

Thus, the less assured

persons are about their ability to attain positive outcomes
in actual, ongoing interactions with objects, the more psy
chological slack they desire.

The problem of psychological

dysfunction tends to occur when the person has provided so
much psychological slack, to defend effectively against nega
tive actual outcomes,

that it also precludes or reduces the

opportunity for acquiring positive actual outcomes.
Before elaborating on how behavior functions to secure
a desired measure of psychological slack, the following
remarks about evaluating the process in terms of its rela
tionship to "normal" and "abnormal" psychological functioning
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are necessary.

Like most defensive operations

(biological

as well as psychological), providing psychological slack is
associated with both functional and dysfunctional character
istics.

It is viewed as functional in the sense that it

affords individuals with the means of asserting themselves
toward maximizing gratification and security while providing
a buffer against the potential threat of deprivation and
rejection.

If one were not able to "soften" the implications

of negative outcomes, one would probably remain in a constant
state of panic, reservation,

and helplessness.

Psychological

slack facilitates the ability to assume the potential risk of
failure in an attempt to meet effectively the demands of psy
chological development.

In a related fashion,

it allows an

individual to utilize effectively the compensatory functions
of the shifting process from one dimension of experience to
the other to maximize psychological security during periods
of felt rejection and deprivation.

It is viewed here as the

process which allows one to feel potent and significant in
spite of actual conditions which reveal impotence and insig
nificance,

and permits one to feel hopeful in the midst of

despair.
On the other hand, psychological slack tends to become
dysfunctional when exaggerated to the degree that it under
mines the opportunity to acquire the very reassurances for
which the person initiated the defensive measure.
degrees,

In such

it is analogous to the paradox of the person who
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avoids eating because of the fear that the food is poisoned
and, in the process,

starves to death.

From this viewpoint,

"normal" personality development

proceeds when the person introduces sufficient psychological
slack to facilitate risk-taking in attempts to acquire needed
assurances, but delimits its use sufficiently so that it does
not preclude the opportunity for acquiring such assurances
from actual objects.
Clinical Manifestations of Psychological
Slack : Maintaining a Fail-Safe System
Between Actual and Fantasy Dimensions of
Experience
Individuals adopt certain patterns of activity, mood
dispositions,

as well as expressed personal attitudes and

preferences which permit them to either avoid certain "arenas"
of interactions within actual conditions, and/or provide per
sons with a means of providing the necessary cognitive flex
ibility to discount the significance of negative outcomes
which might arise from certain actual interactions.

When

such patterns provide such a function, they are classified as
modes of psychological slack.
For discussion purposes, patterns of behavior will be
addressed under three separate domains:
and preferences,

(1) personal beliefs

(2) affective or mood dispositions, and

characterological traits.

(3)

However, beyond facilitating the

organization of presentation, these domains of personality
functioning are viewed as being interdependent.
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The traditional concept of personal attitudes, values,
and preferences indicates that they result from a process of
internalizing familial-cultural norms and values.

Through

the process of role-modeling and identification, certain
expressed beliefs and preferences are inculcated within one's
referent social group and, subsequently, are internalized.
However, the proposed model suggests that while such patterns
may be initially derived from a social learning context,
their persistence underlies their function of providing psy
chological slack.

The cliche "I was brought up that way" is

viewed from this perspective as being an accurate statement
of etiology but a rationalization for its persistence over
time.

What is being suggested is that one is selective in

one's persistence of attitudes and preferences on the basis
of their utility in providing psychological slack, apart from
their existence in response to their historic source.
Persons utilize their expressed attitudes and prefer
ences frequently as a means of justifying why they delimit
attempts to interact with certain objects in certain situa
tions.

The model reflects the notion that when persons per

ceive little confidence in their ability to demonstrate
effective performance in a particular mode of interaction,
they can generate a fail-safe system by providing psychologi
cal slack in adopting a dislike, a religious injunction or
prohibition,

and/or an ideological stance which can serve to

account for the lack of positive outcomes related to that
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mode of interaction.

For example, an individual who

expresses a dislike for cocktail parties may account for this
negative preference by suggesting a contempt for "idle con
versation" or "social-climbing."

However,

in actuality, this

individual perceives little confidence in the ability to per
form well enough in the context of a cocktail party to secure
a desired position of significance in relation to others
there.

By adopting and justifying a negative preference for

cocktail parties,

this individual is able to avoid pursuing

performance in a particular arena which exists in the per
son's actual, ongoing conditions but, at the same time, pro
vides for the validity of the following fantasy theme:
I cared to attend cocktail parties,

"If

I would be able to demon

strate my ability to impress these other persons."
This negative preference provides psychological slack
even when that person is at a cocktail party.

Persons do not

expect themselves to pursue a performance to the best of
their "true" ability when they express no commitment to do
so.

An individual's expressed attitudes and preferences

justify why there is no interest in pursuing a particular
interaction to the fullest ability.

Consequently,

it is not

necessary for a person to test performance capabilities in an
area which one avoids by means of cognitive sanctions or
injunctions.

Thus,

"I do not have any desire to pursue a

particular outcome" provides psychological slack against "I
do not have the ability to achieve a particular set of
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positive outcomes in this area."

Related to the function of

underwriting the person's capacity to discount cognitively
the validity of outcomes resulting in certain actual condi
tions, it maintains the validity of fantasy outcomes related
to this area of interaction.

Thus, such psychological slack

permits persons to shift towards the fantasy dimension of
experience and allows them to assign validity to the fanta
sied outcomes for maintaining psychological security in spite
of actual performances.
A person's resistance to altering expressed beliefs and
preferences underlies the individual's desire to retain these
as factors which provide psychological slack in the manner
described.

In fact,

clinically,

a potentially less threaten

ing and less obtrusive manner of determining an individual's
level of self-assurance and security with regard to particu
lar domains of functioning is to inquire as to the individ
ual's expressed preferences and attitudes in relation to such
areas.

It is theorized that the degree of resistance to

altering or relinquishing particular beliefs, attitudes,

and

preferences is abated when individuals become more confident
in their ability to achieve positive outcomes.
Within this proposed theoretical system, the aspect
which remains as an unconscious operation is that related to
a person's dissociation between the process of generating
psychological slack and the products, the patterns of behav
ior which serve as psychological slack.

That is, the
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fail-safe factors or flaws utilized in providing psychologi
cal slack are always accessible to consciousness, but the
fact that these are actively maintained for the purpose of
providing psychological slack tends to remain unconscious.
In this respect, the psychoanalytic concept that the origin
and function of a particular defensive operation tend to
remain unconsciously dissociated from the manifestation of
the defense is also maintained in regard to the present model.
However, there are three major theoretical differences
in perspective with regard to the unconscious dissociation
between the process and products of psychological defensive
operations in comparing the traditional analytic concept and
the one rendered by the present theoretical system.

The

first theoretical point of difference is that traditional
psychoanalytic theory posits that the motive underlying this
unconscious dissociation between the source and process of
the defensive operation and the manifestation of the defense
is an attempt to reduce the anxiety associated with the urge
to gratify certain instinctual impulses and trends.

The

present model attributes the motive for this unconscious dis
sociation to a person's desire to generate fail-safe factors
and flaws into certain actual conditions of performance while
maintaining the cognitive precept that these flaws exist as
inherent characteristics of that particular set of actual
conditions.

That is, it is an attempt to externalize the

responsibility for the existence of fail-safe factors
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utilized in providing psychological slack.

Secondly, it

appears that the traditional psychoanalytic view suggests
that an effective transformation within the individual of the
unconscious nature of the dissociation to a conscious state
of awareness is a necessary condition for reducing or elimi
nating the individual's unconscious drive to persist in
generating the particular defensive process.

However, the

present theoretical system proposes that such a transforma
tion is not a necessary condition in order for the individual
to relinquish or reduce the drive underlying the persistence
of the particular defensive operation involved.

Finally, the

third major theoretical distinction is that the present model
reflects the view that not only is the effective interpreta
tion of the unconscious dissociation not a necessary condi
tion, but, in addition,

it proposes that it is not a

sufficient condition as well for counteracting resistance.
These points of theoretical difference between the two
theoretical systems rest on the different sources of resis
tance promulgated by each of these models.

The emphasis

placed upon interpreting the nature of the unconscious dis
sociation is reflective of the traditional psychoanalytic
view that in order to alter personality functioning,
chological significance of past,
be effectively altered.

the psy

formative experiences must

In contrast, the present theoretical

system proposes that the only implications the past has are
relative to the present and future capacity to acquire
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positions of significance in relation to certain objects.
Anxiety issues from concerns about maintaining the precept
of such a capacity in ongoing and future situations, despite
the past, not only in light of it.

According to the view

reflected by the proposed model, one cannot "relive" the past
to acquire the assurances of this capacity; one can only
achieve them in the present and future.
Thus, resistance is not maintained by unconsciously
based defenses developed in one's formative past, but rather
by unconsciously based defenses developed in the interdepen
dent process between one's present and future experiences.
Moreover,

awareness of the nature of the threats to a per

son's capacity to be significant to certain objects in the
past is not a salient process if the person is seeking assur
ances from such objects in present and future situations.

In

short, the proposed model subscribes to the concept that in
the context of psychotherapy or other setting,

if a person

can achieve the desired reassurances for which the uncon
scious defensive process has been developed, the impetus for
the defense can be removed without the person ever being
aware or needing to be aware of its existence.
From this perspective, awareness of the nature of the
unconscious dissociation between certain patterns of person
ality functioning and their use as modes of psychological
slack tends to be useful to the therapist
understanding an individual's needs.

(change agent)

in

However, these needs
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can be filled without attempting to make the individual aware
of their origin and existence.

Within the framework of the

present model, a person's resistance is not to becoming aware
of the sources of unconsciously felt threats issuing from the
past, but to assuming the risks associated with counteracting
unconsciously felt threats to the fantasied future.
In line with the view, one's behavior patterns frequently
represent a pro-active adjustment to anticipated,

future

interactions rather than merely representing the effects of
a reactive response to past experiences.

Accordingly, there

is an important theoretical distinction assumed within the
model between an emotional "response" and an emotional
"adjustment" to an event.

This distinction is very important

for discussing how affective states are used to provide psy
chological slack which then facilitates cognitive control
over the perceived validity of outcomes.

According to the

model, only one dimension of emotional "response" is recog
nized within the model:

anxiety.

theoretical rubric of the model,

It is assumed, within the
that a positive outcome

relieves one's anxiety about one's capacity to achieve a
desired position in relation to certain objects, and a nega
tive outcome tends to increase one's level of anxiety.

How

ever, a person's emotional "adjustment" to outcomes relates
to how he/she attempts to adjust either to the decreased or
increased level of anxiety which corresponds to the nature
of an outcome which has occurred or is anticipated.
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Emotional adjustment to a positive outcome corresponds
to a person's desire to assign validity to the conditions in
which the outcome occurred and a desire to maintain a pursuit
towards acquiring such outcomes within these conditions.
such,

As

this kind of emotional adjustment is usually manifested

as moods which are expressive of receptivity, warmth, and
acceptance in relation to certain objects.

On the other

hand, emotional adjustment to a negative outcome corresponds
to a person's desire to withdraw from risking further threats
to psychological security within those conditions.

Thus,

while the emotional response to the occurrence or anticipa
tion of a negative outcome is increased anxiety,

the manifes

tation or emotional adjustment may range from apathy to rage,
"flightiness," sadness, grief, or sullenness.
As in the case in which expressed preferences and atti
tudes tend to persist, unconsciously dissociated from their
function of providing psychological slack, emotional adjust
ments frequently tend to be dissociated from the emotional
responses

(anxiety) which evoked such adjustments.

The emo

tional adjustments which are exhibited in relation to
increased anxiety serve as psychological slack to diffuse the
threat of negative outcomes.

For example, such emotions as

anger and apathy underwrite an attempt at perceiving the
immediate, ongoing conditions as inadequate to demonstrate
the abilities depicted in the fantasy dimension of experience.
When one reacts in anger to an outcome,

it signals an attempt
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to generate the precept that there exist certain flaws in
the conditions in which the outcome occurred, and the anger
reflects the frustration in light of these perceived flaws.
Also, by maintaining a hostile disposition toward certain
objects, persons justify their tendency to withhold attempts
at evoking positive outcomes from interactions with such
objects.

In this sense, anger permits one to control the

locus of power with regard to who is rejecting whom, or what.
The expression of apathy or indifference is an emotional
adjustment to anxiety which provides psychological slack for
individuals in a very similar manner to that of anger.
Indifference justifies a person's relative failure at attempt
ing to achieve positive outcomes in interactions with certain
objects.

It provides psychological slack since one can main

tain a precept that a poor performance is due to a lack of
motivation rather than a lack of ability.

As it shall be

explicated in the next chapter, passive-aggressive patterns
are viewed as attempts to undermine or devalue the signifi
cance of objects and/or events in terms of their impact on a
person's psychological security.

Like anger, apathy is an

emotional adjustment which permits one to discredit the
validity of outcomes by reacting to the perceived flaws in
the conditions in which these outcomes occur.

Again, these

emotional adjustments correspond to one's attempt to reject
others before one is rejected by others.

In this manner,

such emotional adjustments underwrite the ability to shift
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from actual, ongoing conditions as a means of acquiring
assurances of interpersonal significance and power to a
fantasied,

future dimension of experience.

Moods which reflect apathy or anger function as psycho
logical slack because these underwrite an attempt to project
inadequacy onto external objects and conditions to account
for negative outcomes and, consequently, preserve an individ
ual's fantasies which depict self-adequacy.

Certain negative

outcomes associated with emotional adjustments feature introjective rather than projective tendencies.

Grief and depres

sion appear to reflect such introjective emotional adjustments
to negative outcomes.

Although on the surface it would

appear that grief and depression are associated with selfeffacement and self-punishment,
psychological slack.

they also serve to provide

Such introjective emotional adjustments

are provoked in situations in which a person has previously
assigned much validity to outcomes resulting from interactions
with a particular object, but who has recently experienced a
profound negative outcome associated with a loss of an estab
lished position of significance in relation to that object.
Whereas anger and apathy are emotional adjustments which
serve to discount or devalue certain actual objects and con
ditions, grief and depression serve to render psychological
slack without devaluing or depreciating the particular actual
object associated with the threat to psychological security.
Instead, these emotions underwrite an attempt to accomplish
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a twofold operation.

First, they are designed to increase

the significance that the object has in relation to the per
son, and secondly, to flaw one's own performance in relation
to that object.
The functions of this twofold operation are as follows.
Since the individual had previously established a strong
position of significance in relation to the object, there is
a tendency to hope for reinstatement to that position.

That

is, there is a desire to hope for the return of a lost or
separated relationship.

By increasing the significance of

that object, the person is attempting to convey this desire
for reinstatement.
punishing pattern,

By engaging in a self-effacing,

self-

the person is attempting to generate the

existence of fail-safe factors which were not perceived
before but which now can serve to account for the loss of
position recently incurred.
generate psychological slack.

It represents an attempt to
The reason individuals wish

to perceive fail-safe factors within their own performance
and avoid discounting the negative outcome through flawing
the object is to encourage the return of the object through
what, in fact,

is flattery.

"I was such a fool" and "if only I had been more under
standing" are fail-safe factors which not only serve to pre
serve the viability of fantasies which depict that outcomes
will be positive because these factors will be reconciled in
the future, but,

in addition,

they underlie an attempt to
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generate positive outcomes for the object.

That is, when

the other person perceives that he/she has such power to
establish such a strong position of significance in relation
to the bereaved person,

it may motivate him/her to "return."

Thus, one effective way for an individual to encourage other
persons to invest

(or reinvest)

in a relationship with that

individual is to give them positive outcomes in interactions
so that the individual becomes a reliable source for validat
ing fantasied abilities which depict importance and stature
in relation to others.
When an individual can no longer maintain a plausible
hope for reinstatement to the previous position of signifi
cance with the object, grief and depression tend to be con
verted to anger and apathy.

That is, the person begins to

generate psychological slack by devaluing the significance
of the object and flawing the conditions of the relationship.
This conversion in process also tends to be facilitated when
the lost object has been replaced, both in one's fantasies
of future interactions and within one's ongoing, actual
interactions.

(A more elaborate presentation of the theoret

ical dynamics involved in depression is found in Chapter III.)
In general, mood dispositions are conceptualized here as
corresponding to attempts to generate emotional adjustments
to defuse the recent occurrence and/or the anticipation of
negative outcomes or, in the case of good moods, to encourage
the reception of positive outcomes.

When one is in a "bad"
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mood, one is cognitively preparing to discount one's actual
performance.

It provides the psychological slack needed to

justify a person's desire to withdraw from further attempts
at risking the encounter of negative outcomes resulting when
one tries to produce positive outcomes.

In addition, bad

moods, in effect, remove the individual from the "arena" of
demonstrating adequate performance in relation to others but,
at the same time, also elicit positive outcomes from others
in terms of their need for succor.

Frequently, persons will

attempt to generate the basis for a bad mood by consciously
and/or unconsciously setting up conditions which cause frus
tration, and the mood is then extended to the "real" situa
tion which is associated with anxiety about incurring
negative outcomes.

For example,

if one is feeling very

anxious about an upcoming event in the afternoon on a partic
ular day, the person may generate conditions during the
morning which generate frustration and anger.

Although the

individual in the example might account for the resultant
bad mood as the reaction to frustrating events in the morn
ing, in actuality, the bad mood is a fail-safe factor which
will serve to provide psychological slack for the afternoon
performance.
As it shall be explained more fully in Chapter III, the
model reflects the proposition that when an individual is
experiencing a period of mood swings, it underlies the fol
lowing kind of situation.

A person has maintained a fantasy
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that certain positive outcomes will occur in the future.
From the fantasied outcomes, the person has derived a great
deal of psychological security.

However, as the time

approaches such that these fantasied outcomes are going to be
put to the test of reality within actual conditions, there
is a tendency for the person to want to prepare for the
occurrence of negative outcomes.

Thus, the ambivalence cen

ters around a desire to express satisfaction and elation in
anticipation of positive outcomes, but,

at the same time, a

desire to build in some potential fail-safe factors which
would permit the person to withdraw validity in the event
that the outcomes are negative rather than positive.

This

kind of situation appears to be reflected in some interper
sonal relationships in which an individual relates on a very
intimate and warm manner towards another on certain occasions
and becomes distant and unaffected in relation to the other
person on other occasions.

This apparent inconsistency

underlies the person's desire to maintain psychological slack
"close at hand" so that the validity assigned to the outcomes
from interactions with the other person can be depreciated in
the event of negative outcomes.
Certain patterns of behavior are not readily classified
as beliefs or mood dispositions, but are viewed as personal
habits or traits by others.

These "characterological traits"

are also often maintained as potential fail-safe factors
which provide a person with psychological slack.

Selfishness,
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rigidity, obnoxiousness, shyness, stuttering, obesity,

sub

stance abuse, and antisocial behavior are among a myriad
number of negative traits which become associated with indi
vidual personalities.

These are generally perceived by

individuals as personal flaws or weaknesses which are part
of their "nature," yet, at the same time, they are not per
ceived by them as intractible.

For example, a person with a

"bad temper" may describe it as a part of a self-identity,
but then may express a desire to learn how to control this
temper, implying a recognition that it is not a permanent
or fixed trait.
In terms of the model, the aspect of the precept that
one is predisposed toward exhibiting a particular feature
serves to justify its existence in present interactions.
other aspect of the precept,

The

that while the trait is an

inherent feature of the past and present,

it can be relin

quished in the future, serves to preserve the plausibility of
fantasied future interactions which depict that without the
negative trait one has the capacity to achieve positive out
comes rather than negative ones.

Thus, the former aspect,

associated with a trait being well engrained, permits one to
justify the existence of the traits in past and present con
ditions of performance while the latter aspect, associated
with its malleability, allows one to shift effectively from
the actual dimension of experience to that of futuristic
fantasies which depict the ability to achieve more positive
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outcomes in the absence of the negative traits.
For instance, shyness tends to provide psychological
slack in interpersonal interactions because the person mini
mizes the risk of initiating attempts at establishing signif
icance in relation to others.

Instead, this trait allows a

person to reduce the risk of a negative outcome since it
dictates that others must initiate a demonstration of inter
est in the person.

The shy, timid individual can cognitively

discount the lack of actual, ongoing outcomes regarding an
ability to impact on certain others on the basis of being
"too shy."

In the meantime,

the person generates a fantasy

dimension of experience which depicts the individual really
trying to assert his/her presence and having a significant
impact on others.

Thus, the shy person tends to persist in

exhibiting the trait to avoid risking the fantasied future
experiences to the test of reality which depict that,

in the

future, when the shyness is overcome, positive outcomes are
realized.
It frequently becomes difficult to relinquish a negative
trait

(i.e., one which a person views as interfering with

performance effectiveness) when an individual has relied upon
it extensively as a fail-safe factor which has provided psy
chological slack during certain past and present interactions.
This is especially so when profound threats arising from
negative outcomes in the past were defused on the basis of
perceiving the existence of this trait as accounting for the
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occurrence of negative outcomes and/or the absence of
positive ones.
Certain negative traits, such as obnoxiousness, are
acquired by persons even though it would appear that they
are clearly sabotaging their own efforts at evoking positive
outcomes.

However, the model suggests that rather than being

self-destructive,

such behavior is self-serving.

By sabotag

ing a chance to elicit positive outcomes from certain others,
the person builds in a very blatant fail-safe factor.

Obnox

iousness or offensive behaviors not only provide attentiongetting devices for an individual, but they serve as a means
of accounting for negative outcomes.

In a sense, obnoxious

ness is a way of demonstrating that certain objects and
events have little significance to persons.

Thus, it under

writes an attempt to depreciate or devalue certain actual
conditions and, consequently,
trying to be at one's best.

reflects a demonstration of not
When persons acknowledge certain

conditions as being valid in terms of testing out their true
performance abilities, then they tend to be on their "best
behavior."

Such patterns of offensive behavior are viewed

here as being a passive-aggressive attempt at undermining the
extent of impact that others will be permitted to have in
relation to persons'

self-appraisal.

When a person exhibits antisocial interactions in rela
tion to certain others and events,

it indicates that the

person lacks confidence in performance ability towards
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achieving positive outcomes within such interactions.

For

example, one who appears to reject, blatantly, current
clothing styles and tends to be offensive in terms of per
sonal appearance may utilize these traits as fail-safe fac
tors in the context of outcomes related to sexual attractive
ness or individual popularity.

Again,

such deviance provides

one with psychological slack to facilitate an attempt to dis
count the validity of the actual conditions in which negative
outcomes might occur and, subsequently, to facilitate the
effectiveness of a shift to the fantasied,
of experience.

future dimension

This process allows one to preserve the

validity of such fantasy experiences which depict that if it
were not for the negative trait, outcomes as reflected to
occur in those fantasy experiences would have resulted and
can result in the future in the absence of that trait.
This concept is extended to explain how antisocial pat
terns of personality tend to reflect a fail-safe system which
has been developed as a means of counteracting threats to
psychological security stemming from frequent experiences of
rejection.

In a sense, the antisocial individual is one who

removes him/hex'self from certain "arenas" of performance by
rejecting those and subscribing to areas of performance and
categories of objects to which the individual can interact
and achieve positive outcomes.

For instance, adolescents who

feel that they may experience negative outcomes while attempt
ing to achieve a position of significance in the context of

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n o f th e copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

80
parental demands and expectations may attempt to develop
attitudes and preferences which serve to reject this arena
of performance.

Instead, they tend to underwrite an attempt

to seek such a position in the context of other adolescents
to whom such a position of significance is perceived as
attainable.

This establishes a fail-safe system because

these adolescents are then able to promote shifts toward the
fantasied,

future dimensions of experience which depict that

when they care to establish a strong position of significance
in relation to the parents, they will have the capacity to do
so.

(A more elaborate discussion of sociopathic and anti

social personality patterns is presented in the next chapter.)
This view of resistance should be understood to suggest
that a person may initially develop certain modes and pat
terns of relating to objects as a function of historic
determinants.

However,

the issue of their persistence is

associated with the person's utilization of these patterns in
the service of providing psychological slack needed to under
write an effective fail-safe system of performance in the
context of actual, ongoing interactions.

The major theoreti

cal inference derived from this view of resistance is that in
order for interventions to be effective in reducing resis
tance to altering established patterns of behavior,

the locus

of emphasis must go beyond the issue of their historic
determinants.
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Resistance to Behavior C h a n g e :
Maintaining Patterns of Psycho
logical Slack to Ensure an
Effective Shifting Process— A
Fail-Safe System for Performance
The theoretical construct and concepts of the model are
now to be integrated and applied toward a conceptualization
of resistance to behavior change.

To begin this endeavor,

the theoretical dynamics of the model are briefly summarized
as follows.
Persons strive to maximize their psychological security.
That is, individuals have a very strong psychological need to
achieve adequate assurances that they have the ability to
acquire and maintain a position of significance and have
impact in relation to certain objects.

By having such an

ability, these objects remain responsive and reliable sources
of fulfillment of individual needs.

A person's level of psy

chological security depends on the extent to which the out
comes he/she experiences in interactions with objects provide
affirmation of the capacity to be significant and have impact
on them.
The model is based further on the proposition that one
utilizes two dimensions of experience to generate interac
tions with objects and resultant outcomes.

One dimension

corresponds to actual ongoing interactions, and the other to
fantasied interactions with objects.

Thus, an individual has

two sources of ongoing experiences in which to attempt to
acquire assurances needed to maximize psychological security.
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During periods in which sufficient assurances
comes)

(positive out

are not derived from actual, ongoing conditions of

experience, there is a tendency to shift to the fantasy
dimension in which positive outcomes are then generated.
These fantasied positive outcomes serve to compensate for
the lack of actual ones during that period.

The tendency for

such a shift is intensified when there is not only a relative
absence of positive actual outcomes due to a lack of certain
interactions with certain objects, but when negative outcomes
result from actual interactions.
In order to utilize the process of shifting as a means
of maximizing psychological security, persons strive to main
tain cognitive control over the perceived validity of out
comes.

By discounting the perceived validity of negative

actual outcomes, then fantasied positive outcomes can retain
their validity in spite of the actual occurrence of negative
ones.

By developing this kind of fail-safe system in which

potential fail-safe factors are introduced into actual per
formance conditions, one has a way of underwriting cognitive
operations of discounting or discrediting the validity of
actual negative outcomes occurring in these conditions.
provides psychological slack in persons'

This

interactions such

that conditions which produce positive outcomes are assigned
validity, while those conditions resulting in negative out
comes can be perceived as faulty and not having produced a
valid indication of true performance capacity.

This

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n of th e cop yrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

83
fail-safe system permits an individual to rely on the out
comes generated in the fantasied future dimension of experi
ence when sufficient assurances are not being acquired in the
actual ongoing dimension of interaction.

In order to facili

tate or generate the perception of inadequate or flawed con
ditions, the person adopts modes of relating to actual
objects such as personal attitudes and beliefs, emotional
adjustments, and characterological patterns which provide the
psychological slack required to underwrite the features of a
fail-safe system.
Given this theoretical framework for the model, resis
tance to behavior change is conceived as being related to a
desire to maintain an established fail-safe system in
response to adjusting to current performance conditions.
Persons tend to resist changing modes and patterns of inter
actions when the persistance of these patterns is in the
service of providing psychological slack.
to complain, remain critical, withdraw,

Thus, persons tend

and become hostile in

response to obstacles which impede their effective perfor
mance in relation to certain objects, but frequently they
also maintain resistance to interventions which would remove
such obstacles or flaws from their conditions of performance.
The degree of psychological slack maintained by persons
tends to reflect the extent to which persons have underlying
doubts about their ability to achieve actual positive out
comes.

As such, the crucial factor involved in dealing with
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resistance to relinquishing modes and patterns of behavior
which provide psychological slack is the acquisition of
increased self-assurance in that area of doubt.

Moreover,

a paradoxical situation arises because the modes of inter
actions in the service of providing psychological slack to
discount the validity of negative outcomes also tend to
reduce and, in some cases, preclude the probability of
achieving positive outcomes.

This paradoxical tendency fre

quently leads to psychological dysfunctions by virtue of a
self-perpetuating cycle which tends to escalate in intensity.
That is, the more self-doubt that exists about a particular
area of performance, the more psychological slack is needed
to underwrite a fail-safe system of actual performance to
ensure an effective shifting operation between actual and
fantasied,

future dimensions of experience.

In turn, the

more psychological slack persons introduce into that area of
actual interaction,

the less likely it is that they will

achieve the assurances needed to raise the level of confi
dence in the performance capacity.

Over time, the cumulative

effect of a lack of positive actual outcomes is such that in
order to maintain the perceived validity of fantasied future
outcomes,

in light of their protracted absence in actual

conditions,

the degree of psychological slack needed to

underwrite the fail-safe system becomes exacerbated.

This

cycle of escalation in its severe forms often corresponds to
clinical indications of psychological decompensation and/or
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severe personality disorders.
In psychotherapy, attempts to counteract this proposed
source of resistance tends to involve a catch-22 syndrome.
On one hand, both the client and therapist are striving for
certain assurances which have been precluded because of the
persistence of certain fail-safe factors.

On the other hand,

each is fearful of relinquishing these important components
of their fail-safe systems.

In regard to the client, this

is viewed as client resistance to psychotherapy, and in rela
tion to the therapist, this process is viewed as counter
resistance in psychotherapy.
This kind of interactional effect is such that in psy
chotherapy,

the client's resistance to relinquishing certain

modes of psychological slack tends to engender a counter
resistance on the part of the therapist, who remains unwill
ing to yield positive outcomes in light of the client's
resistance to elicit for such outcomes.

For example, the

client who brings into the psychotherapy relationship a great
deal of self-doubt about the capacity to be lovable and spe
cial to another might also bring into the relationship such
strong modes of psychological slack that they inhibit the
therapist's willingness to take the risk of interacting with
the client in a warm and nurturing manner.
In effect, clients tend to bring into the psychotherapy
relationship a "magical wish" whereby they demand positive
outcomes but, at the same time, demand that they be permitted
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to retain the fail-safe features related to achieving such
outcomes in actual conditions of performance.

A client's

magical wish reflects a desire to retain a system of psycho
logical defenses while still having the capacity to experi
ence outcomes which have traditionally not occurred because
of these defenses.

To the extent a therapist can accept and

service a client's magical wish, resistance to behavior
change can be counteracted effectively.
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CHAPTER III
Application of the Model to Clinical
Theory and Practice
The present chapter is concerned with applying the theo
retical concepts of the model to clinical theory and practice.
The emphasis is on delineating the theoretical dynamics of
resistance to the process of behavior change as these occur
in psychotherapy by applying these concepts of the model.
The discussion will deal first with how the concept of
psychological dysfunction or pathology is discerned within
the theoretical context of the model.

From this context, the

dynamics of resistance in psychotherapy shall be presented,
extending the concept of the "magical wish."

Next, the dis

cussion will turn to some general theoretical propositions
associated with counteracting the sources of resistance in
psychotherapy.

Finally, a number of clinical categories of

psychological dysfunction will be conceptualized within the
theoretical frame of the model and then discussed in terms of
their sources of resistance to change, and how these sources
can be counteracted in the process of psychotherapy.
Functional Versus Dysfunctional
Fail-Safe Systems
Within the theoretical frame of the model, psychopathol
ogy or psychological dysfunction is both the result of a dys
functional fail-safe system for interacting with certain
87
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objects, as well as the continued manifestation of a dysfunc
tional fail-safe system.

In distinguishing between functional

and dysfunctional fail-safe systems, it is understood that
these categories are continuous and not discrete entities.
With this point in mind, the following two interrelated char
acteristics are utilized in making a theoretical distinction
between fail-safe systems which are functional and those
which are dysfunctional.
First,

for a particular fail-safe system to remain func

tional, the persistence of modes of behavior providing psy
chological slack must preserve psychological security in the
face of actual negative outcomes without precluding chances
for the achievement of actual positive outcomes.

Thus, while

a person desires sufficient modes of psychological slack as a
contingency factor in the event that positive outcomes are
not achieved,

these modes should not sabotage the person's

level of performance to the degree that it virtually elimi
nates the probability of incurring positive outcomes.

In

cases in which the opportunity to generate positive actual
outcomes is reduced significantly, the intensified selfperpetuating process alluded to in the previous chapter tends
to be set in motion over a period of time.

That is, persons'

protracted inability to achieve actual assurances requires
that they generate an increasing level of psychological slack
to buttress the tenuous validity of fantasied, future assur
ances, and this increase in psychological slack tends even
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further to reduce the opportunity for acquiring actual assur
ances, and so the cycle continues to intensifysituation, persons'
tional.

In this

fail-safe systems are viewed as dysfunc

They not only restrict the levels of interpersonal

intimacy since little validity is assigned to actual objects
and ongoing conditions, but, in addition, they perpetuate and
increase the level of self-doubt for which the systems were
initially designed to counteract.
Secondly, an interrelated characteristic of a functional
fail-safe system is that it permits a person to retain a
fluid shifting process between the two dimensions of experi
ence.

A dysfunctional fail-safe system imposes a more rigid

and less flexible shifting operation.

A flexible and fluid

shifting operation permits one to periodically withdraw psy
chologically from actual conditions of performance and let
psychological security rest on the fantasied,
sion of experience.

future dimen

Such flexibility in shifting is mani

fested in one's capacity to relax, to let go of pragmatic and
mundane issues, to imagine and process things creatively, and
to render perspective to actual circumstances by being able
to perceive them in the context of their implications to
future, anticipated experiences.

At the same time, the fluid

capacity for shifting facilitates an individual's responsive
ness to the actual dimension of experience,

that is, grasping

opportunities to acquire assurances by assigning validity to
certain actual objects and events occurring from moment to
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m oment.
A dysfunctional fail-safe system of performance is asso
ciated with an individual who tends to become "locked" into
a dimension of experience following a shifting operation, and
who is either unable to withdraw from actual conditions of
performance or has difficulty withdrawing from the fantasied
set of interactions with objects and events.

Concept of the "Magical
Wi s h " in Psychotherapy
A dilemma may be defined as a situation which requires
that one assume the risk of unfavorable consequences result
ing from a choice between equally undesirable alternatives.
When a person is confronted with such a dilemma, there is a
tendency to operate initially from a wish to have the power
to assume only the favorable consequences of a choice and
resist or deny those which are unfavorable— the power to
"have one's cake and eat it too."
as a person's magical w i s h .

This notion is termed here

Resistance in psychotherapy

exists as a function of the persistence of such magical
wishes.

For a client, the magical wish reflects a desire to

achieve assurances in areas of actual performance which have
been precluded by the persistence of certain modes of psycho
logical slack but still retain the effects of a fail-safe
system engendered by such psychological slack.

The terms of

clients' magical wishes stem from the dilemma which they
face.

That is, clients are confronted with a choice between
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assuming the risk of losing their capacity to discount the
validity of actual negative outcomes which permit an effec
tive shift to occur to the fantasied,

future dimension of

experience, or not risking this capacity to discount the
validity of actual negative outcomes while continuing to
experience an absence of positive outcomes in actual, ongoing
interactions with objects.

Both alternatives are undesirable

for clients since each one requires that they assume further
risk to an already tenuous level of psychological security.
If clients choose to relinquish the current modes of psycho
logical slack which underwrite the ability to assign validity
to the fantasied,

future dimension of experience in attempt

ing to achieve positive actual outcomes,

they risk losing

their fantasies to reality if negative actual outcomes occur
instead.

The other alternative is associated with the source

of risk that while clients may continue to preserve the
viability of fantasied,

future outcomes by continuing to dis

count the validity of the absence of positive actual outcomes,
these fantasied outcomes begin to lose their plausibility
over time if there continues to be insufficient support of
their plausibility rendered by actual performance.

Thus,

clients' magical wishes are to achieve certain products
(actual positive outcomes) without assuming the risk associ
ated with the process required to achieve such products.
A therapist's magical wish would be that the client
relinquish these modes of psychological slack as a
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prerequisite condition for acquiring such assurances within
actual, ongoing conditions.

This magical wish associated

with therapists stems from their desire to protect their own
psychological security by maintaining their capacity to be
significant and effectual.

Frequently,

a client's modes of

psychological slack are viewed by a therapist as the obstacles
to the therapist's ability to be successful in having suffi
cient impact on, and effectiveness with, the client.

Often,

therapists tend to generate their own fail-safe systems to
protect their psychological security by adopting the precept
that the client is not amenable or responsive to psychotherapy
because the client is unable to relinquish defenses which are
too well engrained.

Thus,

it is proposed that frequently

therapists tend to operate from a magical wish which involves
their insistence that the client relinquish his/her defensive
operation in order to achieve certain assurances from the
therapist and others.
As such, the respective magical wishes of the client and
therapist represent antagonistic trends.

From the point of

view reflected by the model, a client's resistance in psycho
therapy tends to persist as a function of the counter
resistance stemming from a therapist's insistence of his/her
magical wish.

The major theoretical proposition in applying

the model to the practice of psychotherapy is that to the
extent that a therapist is unsuccessful in accepting and
responding to the terms of a client's magical wish,
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resistance to behavior change remains.

That is, resistance

to the process of behavior change is counteracted when the
client is able to retain certain modes of psychological slack
and still achieve actual positive outcomes in areas of per
formance for which such a fail-safe system of defenses is
desired.

These are the terms of the client's magical wish,

although usually a client does not express the conditional
terms of the wish, but only the statement concerned with the
desire to achieve certain actual assurances.
For example,

"I wish I could be more assertive,"

"I wish

I could stop feeling depressed," and "I wish I could find a
friend" are statements derived from magical wishes which do
not express the conditional terms.

Each of these statements

expresses a desire for an outcome or a state of being which
is, in fact, accessible to an individual, but the individual
seems to operate implicitly on the premise that it is not.
For instance, persons who wish that they could be more "asser
tive" know which modes of behavior are expressive of this
attribute but seem to convey a source of resistance to enlist
ing these modes.

Therapists who begin to operate without

understanding and responding to the conditional terms which
clients generally leave unstated tend to become frustrated
by the client's "resistance" and begin to insert their own
fail-safe systems to counteract their feelings of ineffec
tuality in relation to the client, which further intensifies
the client's resistance to the process.
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Within the theoretical frame of the model,

the primary

thrust of the psychotherapy process should be twofold.

First,

a therapist must determine the terms of a client's magical
wishes, both the stated objectives
feel lonely")

(e.g.,

"I do not want to

and the unstated, conditional term related to

achieving that objective

(e.g., " . . . but I do not want to

permit my psychological security to become vulnerable to
unsuccessful attempts at not being lonely").

Secondly,

a

therapist must endeavor to intervene in such a way as to
accept and to respond to these terms of a client's magical
wish.

The next section is a presentation of some theoretical

principles in accomplishing this twofold process in psycho
therapy .

General Principles in Accepting and
Responding to Clients' Magical Wishes
In order to establish a clear ground for these princi
ples, the following remarks are made in reiterating,

in some

cases, and elaborating in other cases, on some of the con
cepts presented thus far in this chapter.
work of the present model,

Within the frame

client resistance in psychotherapy

issues from a client's persistence of one or more magical
wishes.

These involve a desire to secure certain assurances

in particular areas of performance without having to relin
quish the modes of interacting which provide psychological
slack for the client in relation to those areas of perfor
mance.

Counter-resistance in psychotherapy issues from a
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therapist's persistent nonacceptance and non-responsiveness
to the terms of a client's magical wishes.

Such counter

resistance reflects the actual conditions external to those
in psychotherapy in which the client's modes of psychological
slack precluded or, at least, reduced the probability that
others will provide the assurances which the client seeks.
What is being suggested here is that clients typically
extend the conditional terms of their magical wishes in
interactions with actual objects external to the psychotherapy
setting, and generally these terms are not accepted nor are
they responded to by these objects.

The concept of counter

resistance in psychotherapy can be understood in terms of a
therapist's failure to alter such a course of events.

This

notion of counter-resistance is associated with the tendency
to elicit complementary responses when interacting with
objects.

For example, when an individual maintains a dis

tant, hostile posture towards another, there is a tendency
for the other person to respond in a complementary fashion,
that is, the other person becomes distant and hostile in
relation to the individual.

The person's hostility is a mode

of psychological slack which underwrites his/her capacity to
discount the validity of outcomes resulting from interactions
with the other person.

Thus, an inability to establish a

desired position of significance in relation to that other
person

(i.e., to feel rejected or rebuffed)

validity.

is not assigned

The hostility provides a fail-safe factor in that
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it underwrites the individual's desire not to try to secure
such a position of significance to that other person.

This

facilitates a shift toward the fantasy dimension of experi
ence which depicts that if it were not for the fact that the
other person is "unacceptable," the individual would pursue
and be successful in acquiring a strong position of signifi
cance to the other person, and, in the future, this can be
demonstrated in relation to "acceptable" persons.
To the extent that this individual generalizes and per
sists in the hostile attitude toward others,
fail-safe system becomes dysfunctional.

the individual's

It discounts the

validity of actual occurrences of rejection by others, but as
long as only complementary responses are elicited,

it pre

cludes the occurrence of actual outcomes which assure the
individual of the capacity to be liked and well regarded by
o thers.
Others tend to react in such a complementary fashion to
preserve their own sense of psychological security since the
hostility signals an anticipation of negative outcomes occur
ring in the interactions with the hostile individual.

Thus,

the counter-resistance on the part of others to accept the
terms of the individual's magical wish,

"I want to be loved

and regarded by you, but I also want to act in a way which
devalues your significance to me so I can continue to under
write a shift towards fantasy experiences," tends to occur as
a function of others' persistence in preserving their own
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psychological security.
As a client,

this individual brings into the psycho

therapy relationship the distress related to not being loved
and cared about, but, at the same time, a fail-safe system
which sabotages the actual conditions for securing assurances
of the client's capacity to be loved and cared about.

Any

astute therapist or clinician could note the client's hostile
modes of interaction but would frequently respond in a com
plementary way,

implicitly demanding that the client assign

validity and significance to the therapist as the prerequi
site condition for reciprocating with nurture and care.

If

the client does not fulfill the therapist's magical wish,
then the therapist tends to view the client as hostile and
resistant to psychotherapy.

The client's resistance in psy

chotherapy persists as a function of counter-resistance on
the part of the therapist to accepting and responding to the
terms of the client's magical wish.

In most cases, the

client enters into the psychotherapy relationship with an
already tenuous level of psychological security.

To a large

extent, the client is clutching to the assurances or positive
outcomes generated from the capacity to shift towards the
fantasied,

future dimension of experience,

relying on the

modes of psychological slack to discount the validity of
actual, ongoing experiences.

However, the fail-safe system

has become dysfunctional because it has eliminated or signif
icantly reduced the probability of acquiring actual, positive
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outcomes.

Consequently, a more intense reliance upon the

ability to maintain the shift away from interacting within
actual, ongoing conditions in favor of fantasied, future
experiences as the primary source of psychological security
occurs.

A client's magical wish is to be able to buttress

or strengthen the sagging hope derived from the shifting
operation without having to risk losing what little reassur
ance or hope is made available through the operation.

The

idea of relinquishing the modes of psychological slack needed
to underwrite the effectiveness of the shift towards the fan
tasied,

future dimension to secure actual sources of reassur

ance may persist as an untenable alternative for the client.
The remainder of this section of discussion offers some
principles for accepting and responding to the terms of a
client's magical wishes,

that is, ways to counteract client

resistance to behavior change.

These are presented as

follows.
Principle # 1 . Identify the terms of a client's
magical wish, both the statement of desire for
achieving particular outcomes and the conditional
terms which tend to remain unspoken.
The primary objective of this first principle is to
determine what kinds of assurances clients are seeking, to
counteract existing or potential threats to their psycho
logical security,

and the modes of psychological slack which

these clients tend to use in underwriting a fail-safe system
for pursuing such assurances.

This objective can be accom

plished in numerous ways.
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Traditional clinical approaches and techniques,

although

not expressly designed to determine these kinds of informa
tion in the context of the model,
obtaining such information.

can provide sources for

Projective test instruments and

some other formal or informal psychometrics can be adminis
tered and their results interpreted in a way which reveals
the terms of magical wishes.
Any clinical approach or style which addresses the fol
lowing lines of inquiry could provide an effective means of
identifying the terms of a client's magical wish:

(a) How is

the client's present life different than when it was experi
enced 2, 5, 10, 15 . . . years ago through the fantasied,
future dimension?

From the perception of the client, what

circumstances prevailed in the actual conditions of living
which account for the discrepancy?

(b) How does the client

imagine his/her life 2, 5, 10, 15 . . . years from now?

What

kinds of conditions does the client perceive as necessary for
achieving such life experiences in this future period?
Therapists who are oriented towards exploring a client's
past formative object relations can attempt to form clinical
impressions in terms of what kinds of assurances
outcomes)

a client failed to receive.

(positive

Then, they can attempt

to identify the nature of the fail-safe features the client
has developed in relation to preserving psychological security
to cope in further interactions with certain objects,

in

light of the past.
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Again, there exist numerous ways or vehicles for ascer
taining the terms of a client's magical wish.

This first

principle corresponds to a diagnostic phase which is a pre
requisite to treatment intervention.

That is, a therapist

must identify the magical wish before it can be responded
to in an effective manner.
The view reflected in the model proposes that desired
assurances not acquired in past actual interactions with
objects cannot be achieved in the past; they can only be
acquired in present and future actual interactions.

Thus,

while exploration of past experiences may provide useful
information with regard to identifying the nature of clients'
magical wishes,

such wishes must be serviced in the context

of ongoing and future object relations apart from historic
interactions.
The point of this first principle is that the therapist
should determine what kinds of positive outcomes were not
achieved developmentally, so that the conditions required to
institute adequate opportunities to experience such assur
ances can be established in the client's present and future
actual interactions.

However,

in this regard, a therapist

must remain sensitive to the conditional terms of a client's
magical wish since these terms suggest the modes of psycho
logical slack which the client has developed to retain the
validity of future,
experiences.

fantasied experiences in light of past

It is this term of the magical wish which
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presents the client's potential source of resistance to a
therapist's interventions.

After a therapist identifies the

terms of a client's magical wish, the psychotherapy process
should deal with the client's fail-safe system of performance.
This consideration brings to the fore the next theoretical
principle.
Principle # 2 . Attempt to make a dysfunctional
fail-safe system more functional.
If a therapist is to be effective in responding to a
client's magical wish, there must be an attempt to facilitate
situations in which the client is permitted to achieve the
desired products of a process without having to assume the
risk of engaging in the process itself.

If clients perceive

that they must test out fantasied performance abilities in
actual conditions to achieve the assurances needed to bolster
psychological security, the terms of the magical wish are not
being carried out.

In such a situation, the client will tend

to persist in maintaining the dysfunctional fail-safe features
in order to ensure the effectiveness of a shift toward the
fantasied,

future dimension of experience for such assurances.

If the resistance to relinquishing the dysfunctional features
is to be counteracted,

then the psychotherapy process must

permit the client to ensure the validity of the client's
fantasies against the threat of actual negative outcomes.
This second principle suggests that a therapist can
accept and respond to the terms of a magical wish by restruc
turing a client's dysfunctional fail-safe system so that it
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becomes functional.

That is, it is an attempt to permit a

client to ensure the ability to reinstate psychological
security by means of a shift towards fantasy experiences
against the potential occurrence of negative, actual outcomes,
without precluding the opportunity to achieve positive
outcomes.
Certain therapy techniques in current practice by some
clinicians produce the conditions suggested by this principle.
Many of these techniques could be broadly subsumed within the
framework of "paradoxical intent" interventions.

Generally,

such an intervention involves a situation in which a client
is instructed to act ostensibly in a way intended to produce
one effect, but the result is that this activity produces
another effect
intended.

(often the obverse effect)

rather than the one

In regard to the present model, paradoxical intent

serves to permit an individual to retain certain modes of
psychological slack

(i.e., symptoms), but allows the client

to remain in a position to experience positive outcomes for
which the modes function to underwrite a fail-safe system.
As suggested,

certain clinical techniques in practice

seem to reflect the theoretical aspects of this principle,
although their functional effects may be interpreted differ
ently by those who practice them.
therapy techniques,

For example, certain sex

such as "sensate focus," seem to provide

clients with a functional fail-safe system for achieving cer
tain actual assurances or positive outcomes.

As Kaplan
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(1974)

suggested,

a therapist's instructions for the sensate

focus exercise obviate the necessity for sexual performance
ability per se, but they still place the client(s)

in an

actual situation in which positive outcomes from having
sexual impact and significance on another can be experienced.
Since the client(s)

is instructed that the exercise is not

geared to be a prelude to coitus or the achievement of orgasm,
it provides an inherent mode of psychological slack which
underwrites a fail-safe feature and minimizes the risk asso
ciated with attempting to demonstrate prowess in sexual per
formance.

For clients who suffer situational or secondary

sexual impotence,

techniques similar to sensate focus permit

them to retain the symptom, but, at the same time, they pro
vide opportunities for achieving positive outcomes which tend
to relieve the underlying anxiety associated with the symptom.
Such techniques tend to be responsive to a client's magical
wish, and, consequently,

resistance to the process of therapy

tends to abate significantly.
The theoretical proposition underlying Principle #2 is
that by replacing certain features

(i.e., modes of psycho

logical slack) of a dysfunctional fail-safe system so that
it becomes functional, opportunities are made available for
clients to experience actual positive outcomes and, in the
process, still retain insurance to protect the validity of
fantasied,

future outcomes.

This permits clients to perceive

that they can retain the capacity to discount the validity of
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actual negative experiences and shift back to the fantasied,
future dimension in case actual positive outcomes fail to
occur.

The assumption is that as a client experiences posi

tive outcomes from a functional fail-safe system of perfor
mance, the perceived need to generate psychological slack
(i.e., symptoms)

is reduced accordingly.

This theoretical principle appears to be further
reflected in the ideas and clinical practices of Erickson
(cited in Haley,

1973)

and Kelly

(1955).

They operate from

a process of psychotherapy which engenders situations in
which their clients are permitted to retain modes of psycho
logical slack but in which such fail-safe features become
functional,

so as to permit the client to experience certain

desired positive outcomes.
This seems to be illustrated in Erickson's work with
clients,

for example,

in the reported case of an adolescent

female who was experiencing psychological distress relating
to her perceived "unattractiveness," in particular, her
breasts

(Haley, 1973).

Her entry into therapy with Erickson

coincided with her upcoming intentions to begin college.
Erickson noted that her anxiety regarding her attractiveness
to men appeared to underlie her tendency to withdraw from and
avoid interpersonal interactions with them.

From the point

of view of the present model, her withdrawal and avoidance
pertaining to such interactions represented a fail-safe sys
tem because she was able to avoid having to confirm the worst
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of her fears and could rely on a fantasied,
of experience instead.

future dimension

Referring back to Erickson's transac

tions with this client, Erickson seemed to emphasize that his
interventions with her did not explicitly require the client
to relinquish her patterns of withdrawing from such interac
tions.

Instead,

it appears that he permitted her to retain

these "symptoms," but he shifted the emphasis of concern by
virtue of hypnotic suggestion to a more "neutral"

zone.

Quoting from Erickson's reported account of his hypnotherapy
interventions:
This series of suggestions have the multiple
purpose of meeting her ambivalence, puzzling and
intriguing her, stimulating her sense of humor,
meeting her need for self-aggression and self
derogation, and yet doing all this without adding
to her distress.
It was done so indirectly that
there was little for her to do but accept and
respond to the suggestions.

The final set of hypnotic instructions was
that she have a thoroughly good time in college.
Making the suggestions in this way effectively
by-passed all discussions of her withdrawn behav
ior and college attendance.
(p. 113)
In addition,

in his further account of this case, Erick

son tended to utilize the client's symptoms
psychological slack)

(i.e., modes of

in a manner which could be fashioned as

a paradoxical intent technique.

That is, he permitted the

client to retain the feelings of her embarrassment with
regard to her breasts, often intensifying this feeling
through his suggestions, but his suggestions still afforded
her the opportunity of interacting with the young men at
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college.
It is interesting to note that it appears characteristic
of Erickson's work with clients that little analysis or inter
pretation is offered to the client, and that although it is
clear that Erickson conceptualizes many attributes of person
ality functioning as resulting from unconscious trends, mak
ing the client aware of the nature of such trends is not an
integral thrust of the process.
Furthermore,

as implied by Haley

(1973), it could be

interpreted that Erickson also tended to view the psycho
therapy process as "re-setting a stage" for a client to
develop a functional fail-safe system of interactions to
achieve certain desired assurances in the present and future
conditions of actual performance,

that is, those which the

client failed to receive in past actual conditions.

In a

sense, it is as if, from a developmental point of view, the
client is permitted to achieve assurances associated with a
particular, past developmental era within ongoing,

actual

experiences.
Another treatment approach, which appears to accomplish
the process suggested by this principle,
fixed-role therapy.

Essentially,

is Kelly's

(1955)

the approach involves ask

ing a client to perform certain role behaviors as if the
client were role-playing rather than being the person per
forming those behaviors in "real life."

The treatment

approach is introduced to a client as representing a brief
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experimentation rather than a permanent attempt to adopt
these patterns of behavior.

This allows the client to dis

sociate these particular patterns in a way which provides
psychological slack since a client does not have to acknow
ledge commitment to a sustained performance towards acquiring
certain outcomes, but, at the same time, the client is placed
in a position in which such outcomes can be achieved anyway.
Such an approach tends to attenuate the intensity of a cli
ent's resistance reflected in the conditional terms of the
magical wish since the client is provided with fail-safe
features but still can pursue certain actual interactions.
Principle #2 also has implications for certain clinical
and behavioral management practices as being antithetical to
the terms of a client's magical wishes.

Consequently, such

practices are deemed here as being ineffective at counter
acting resistance and,
general,

in some cases, intensifying it.

In

it is presumed that those practices or interventions

which require a client to relinquish certain symptoms

(i.e.,

modes of psychological slack) without replacing these with
modes of performance which can serve in their place tend to
be ineffective in psychotherapy.

It is suggested that in

such cases, a client persists in resisting the process geared
toward behavior change, and therapists begin to generate
their own fail-safe features

(i.e., counter-resistance) which

are designed to dismiss the client as being "too resistant"
or "not amenable" to therapy.
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Principle # 3 . Avoid attempts to alter "functional"
fail-safe features of performance in the course of
psychotherapy.
This third principle may be viewed as a corollary to
Principle #2.

Frequently,

in psychotherapy,

clients exhibit

certain characteristics which a therapist may view as being
indicative of psychopathology.

Yet, many of the "symptoms"

which clients reveal are modes of psychological slack under
writing a functional fail-safe system of interaction.

Some

times therapists, because of their own personal needs and
desires, have difficulty tolerating certain modes of psycho
logical slack which may be functional for a client during
that particular point in time.
For example, clients who are very depressed over a
recent loss of a previously established position of signifi
cance in relation to a particular object or event tend to
operate from a fail-safe system which is functional in but
tressing psychological security at that present period in
time.

(The fail-safe features associated with depressive

reactions are discussed further in the chapter.)

However, a

therapist who feels obligated to not permit the client to be
depressed may unwittingly impede that client's ability to
resolve the threat to psychological security incurred as a
result of the recent loss.

Moreover,

the client will tend to

resist the therapist who demands that the client not operate
from feelings of grief, sadness, or self-pity.
In other instances, some therapists may not be able to
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resist the temptation to impress clients
with their clinical astuteness,

(and themselves)

analyzing and interpreting

the motives and bases for their clients'

every aspect of

defense being used to preserve psychological security in
light of their current conditions.

Although such practices

may be in the service of boosting a therapist's own psycho
logical security,

these often occur at the expense of under

mining the effectiveness of the fail-safe features clients
have developed to protect theirs.

For example, an individual

who exhibits a mode of psychological slack involving an
attempt to counteract a recent negative outcome by projecting
blame on certain external circumstances does not need a ther
apist to point out that, in fact, the individual failed on
his/her own account rather than being a victim of such cir
cumstances.

What the client does need is some reassurances

in the present and future conditions of living, and then
such fail-safe features will abate accordingly.
The notion involved in this third principle may be
reflected developmentally.

That is, it is generally recog

nized that many developmental tasks are associated with
acquiring certain perceived mastery and competence in various
modes of interaction with objects.
such assurances of self-adequacy,

In attempting to acquire
individuals tend to give

themselves certain modes of psychological slack which are
utilized until such assurances are achieved,
modes tend to be relinquished.

and then these

From this point of view, the
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primary thrust of psychotherapy should not be directed at
undermining the effectiveness and utilization of clients'
fail-safe systems, but, instead,

it should be directed at

helping clients achieve those assurances in their actual,
ongoing conditions which would permit them then to relinquish
some of these fail-safe features.

This means that therapists

may need to permit themselves to tolerate a client who may be
too introverted,

too hostile, too detached, too compulsive,

or too immature in respect to the therapists'
tions, needs,

own expecta

and desires relative to maintaining their own

psychological security.

Perhaps,

the essence of Principles

#2 and #3 is that resistance to behavior change tends to
occur when therapists resist accepting and responding to
clients'

resistances because of therapists'

concern for the

safety of their own psychological security.

Theoretical Application of the Model
to Selected Clinical Patterns of
Psychological Dysfunction
Psychological dysfunction, as discussed previously, is
viewed as both the product of a dysfunctional fail-safe sys
tem and the intensified persistence of one.
section of discussion,

In this final

some selected clinical categories of

psychological dysfunction are presented.

The thrust of this

presentation is to address each of these clinical categories
within the following context.

First, the clinical attributes

associated with each category are discussed within the theo
retical frame of the model.

In this endeavor,

there is
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little emphasis on attempting to delineate etiological fac
tors.

Instead, the focus is directed at the ongoing dynamics

and effects of the fail-safe features presumed.
Secondly, after considering the nature of the fail-safe
features associated with each of these clinical patterns, the
general terms of the magical wish corresponding to the source
of resistance to each is addressed.

Some suggestions are

offered in terms of applying the theoretical principles
enumerated in the previous section of discussion.
Each of the following clinical patterns is discussed:
anxiety reactions, obsessive-compulsive patterns, grief and
depression reactions, passive-aggressive patterns, antisocial
(sociopathic) patterns, passive-dependence patterns, paranoid
patterns,

and schizophrenic patterns.

Anxiety reaction pa t terns.

This neurotic pattern is

characterized by a relatively constant state of tension,
apprehension, and uneasiness.

Often, the individuals experi

ence acute panic anxiety attacks which punctuate their more
general and diffuse tension and uneasiness.

In this clinical

category, the individual tends to ruminate obsessively over
impending decisions as well as those already made by the
individual.

Characteristically,

the anxiety reactions do not

appear to stem from specific threats, but seem to issue from
more vague and generalized stimuli.
Within the context of the present model, as with the
other clinical patterns to be discussed, anxiety reaction
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patterns are inodes of psychological slack used to underwrite
fail-safe systems for actual performance.

Moreover,

it may

be recalled from the discussion in Chapter II that the model
reflects the view that affective states are emotional, pro
active adjustments to counteract threats to psychological
security and not just responses or reactions to such threats.
Thus, anxiety reactions constitute a kind of emotional
adjustment pattern to threats which is incorporated as a mode
of psychological slack used to discount the validity of
certain actual, ongoing experiences.
It is theorized here that the individual manifesting
this clinical pattern derives fail-safe features in a way
analogous to a person who operates from a laudable and ambi
tious set of intentions or goals and derives a sense of worth
or esteem from the "possession" of these goals, apart from
accomplishing them.

The anxiety reaction pattern serves as

a fail-safe system such that the individual accomplishes
successfully these goals and intentions in the fantasied,
future dimension of experience but is unable to demonstrate
this proficiency in actual conditions because there is always
a crisis situation which must be dealt with first.

Conse

quently, commitment to performance is rarely sustained since
the person's energies must be diverted towards resolving
other issues which intrude upon the scene.
The anxiety reaction is viewed here as underwriting the
level of crisis and urgency the person must perceive in order
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to divert a commitment process in one direction by assuming
a commitment in another direction.

These individuals find

themselves in an almost constant state of ambivalence, not
wanting to give up the pursuit of certain directions of per
formance but also not wishing to commit their performance to
the extent that they must test out their capacity of effec
tiveness in those areas of performance.

Frequently, more

intense and acute states of anxiety reaction are felt by such
persons when they experience situations which require that
the ambivalent posture be replaced by assuming commitment.
For example, a man who has maintained a relatively noncommit
tal relationship with a woman may begin to experience panic
anxiety when he perceives that his position of significance
in relation to her is being threatened by the intrusion of
other men onto the scene.

On one hand, he desires to make a

commitment toward a pursuit of interaction designed to com
pete effectively with the other men for maintaining his posi
tion of being the "one."

However, if he does so, he risks

losing the validity of his fantasied performance outcomes
which demonstrate that when he tries to be the special one
in relation to a woman, he indeed has the capacity to do so.
Thus, he does not want to lose her by not trying, but even
more so, he does not want to lose her despite his trying.
The ensuing anxiety reaction serves to immobilize him
so that he makes himself feel helpless and, consequently,
unable to assert himself in resolving the situation.

If he
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loses her, it is because he is involved with so many problems
that he is unable to compete effectively for maintaining his
position of significance in relation to her.

Thus, the anxi

ety reaction underwrites a fail-safe system which ensures
that in the event of actual negative outcomes, the shift
toward the fantasied,

future dimension remains an effective

source for experiencing positive outcomes to counteract the
actual negative ones.
It is speculated that, in most cases, a client entering
psychotherapy due to acute or panic anxiety attacks has
reached the stage in which certain events and/or objects
require a commitment to performance in order to counteract
an impending loss of position of significance in relation to
them.

Frequently,

such clients have begun to transform the

emotional adjustment concerning their high level of anxiety
response to the situation by manifesting phobic-like or panic
anxiety reaction patterns which serve to immobilize them.
The general terms of the client's magical wish are:
want to overcome these anxiety

[or phobic]

"I

reactions so I no

longer feel helpless in my attempt to exert control over my
life."

The conditional terms associated with this aspect of

the wish are:

"But I also want to be assured that if I am

in a position to sustain a performance, it will not destroy
the validity of my future,

fantasied capacities."

Applying Principle #2, the direction of psychotherapy
with such clients should be an attempt to induce them to
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"act out" the performance in question without them having to
acknowledge commitment towards attempting to achieve positive
outcomes from such performance.

Since the anxiety reactions

serve as modes of psychological slack by underwriting an
individual's felt inability to sustain a commitment to demon
strating the capacity to achieve actual positive outcomes, a
therapist must attempt to find a means to allow the client to
sustain a performance attempt without the client having to
acknowledge the attempt itself.

The anxiety reaction pattern

becomes dysfunctional when it permits individuals to abort
completion of attempts to demonstrate the actual capacity to
achieve positive outcomes in certain kinds of interactions
and, therefore, precludes their achievement.

In order to

respond to the client's magical wish, to counteract this
source of resistance, a therapist must allow the client to
retain a fail-safe system, but one which is functional in
that it affords the client opportunities for acquiring these
positive actual outcomes

(Principle #2).

Thus, in order to deal effectively with the resistance
corresponding to the conditional terms of a client's magical
wish associated with the anxiety reaction pattern,

a thera

pist must induce the client to complete the performance in
question without the client acknowledging the intention to
do so.

Consequently, a client does not have to abort the

attempt since the client does not acknowledge commitment
towards accomplishing the particular goal associated with
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the anxiety.
Such techniques as desensitization are effective in this
regard because a client is permitted to punctuate increasing
phases of commitment with the achievement of positive out
comes along the way.

In a sense, the process may be viewed

as a "weaning" away gradually from the more intense modes of
psychological slack that were used by the client.

The empha

sis here is that a therapist must remain sensitive to the con
ditional terms of a client's magical wish in order to counter
act the source of resistance to the process of attempting to
respond to the expressed aspect of the magical wish.
Obsessive- compulsive patterns.

Within the theoretical

frame of the model, the fail-safe features associated with
this pattern are very similar to those encountered with anxi
ety reaction patterns.

The primary distinction is that, with

regard to the obsessive-compulsive pattern, the person makes
very strong commitments to certain areas of performance which
are relatively "safe" in order to avoid such commitments in
more risky domains of actual interactions.
anxiety reactions,

In the case of

individuals tend to remain too immobilized

and too scattered to sustain even more circumscribed, ritu
alistic forms of behavior.
Obsessive-compulsive individuals underwrite their fail
safe system to discount the validity of the relative absence
of more intimate, personalized actual performance in relation
to others by intensifying the importance of more impersonal
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issues and events.

Like the individual associated with

anxiety reaction patterns, the obsessive-compulsive person
intensifies the perception of urgency and crisis as related
to such events.

All of the ramifications must be considered

and not left in the hands of chance.

These individuals

attempt to enhance their self-importance in relation to
accomplishing these compulsive-oriented tasks.
Relaxation and diminished intensity of performance tend
to be anathema since the individual wishes to retain the fail
safe features which underwrite an avoidance of sustained com
mitment in certain other areas of interaction,

in particular,

intimate levels of interpersonal involvement.

Leisure time

allows persons to relate to others, and these individuals
tend to feel impotent without the compulsive "tools" used to
delimit and circumscribe spontaneity.
the compulsive modes,

Consequently, without

levels of intimacy are much more

difficult to avert.
There appears to be a serious irony associated with the
more pronounced obsessive-compulsive pattern.

While the

modes of psychological slack underwrite an effective fail
safe system for interactions in which the individual lacks
sufficient performance confidence,

it leaves the person with

little psychological slack in those areas for which commit
ment is made in lieu of these other, more threatening areas
of interaction.

Thus, although the person is able to dis

count the validity associated with the relative absence of
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positive outcomes in the more interpersonally oriented
spheres of performance, in the trade-off there is little
psychological slack available for underwriting a fail-safe
system to discount the validity of actual negative outcomes
arising within the areas of achievement at which the compul
sive pattern is directed.
Therefore,

in lieu of sufficient psychological slack in

these areas of compulsive performance,

the person is unable

to mitigate or attenuate the high level of stress associated
with ensuring positive outcomes in such areas.

Unable to let

go and escape psychologically from maintaining a vigilant,
stellar capacity of performance in these compulsive areas,
the stress tends to become reflected in psychosomatic dis
orders.

Frequently, physical debility and illness become

the only means by which the person is able to escape tempo
rarily.

Having little psychological slack in these areas of

performance, the person's psychological security remains
extremely vulnerable to actual negative outcomes.

Conse

quently, there is little capacity to generate effective shifts
towards counteracting actual negative outcomes by compensat
ing with fantasied,

future positive outcomes in these compul

sive spheres of performance.

The depression and suicide

potential tends to become elevated in such individuals when
they experience negative outcomes in these achievementoriented areas of performance, because they are unable to
generate effective shifts to counteract these threats.
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While moderate obsessive-compulsive patterns may con
tinue to exist as functional fail-safe systems, the more
extreme patterns tend to become associated with dysfunctional
fail-safe features.

This is especially the case when a

person for reasons of illness, forced retirement, or other
wise is unable to continue effectively within the compulsive
domains of performance and is left with little psychological
slack to underwrite fail-safe features pertaining to inter
personal intimacy and dependency relationships.

In such

cases, agitated depression and symptoms of regression often
appear clinically.
In psychotherapy,

the general terms of the magical wish

associated with the obsessive-compulsive pattern are as fol
lows.

The client tends to express a desire to feel less

tense, to be able to relax and worry less about ongoing and
future concerns.

The conditional terms are that the client

also desires to maintain sufficient fail-safe features in
relation to performances associated with more intimate inter
personal interactions.

A corollary conditional term is that

the client be assured of the ability to remain significant to
certain others in lieu of continuing to derive this capacity
from such achievement-oriented performance.
In psychotherapy,

interventions which require the client

to "learn" how to relax and relinquish the obsessive, rumina
tive component tend to encounter much resistance unless the
conditional terms of the client's magical wish are serviced
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first.

That is, clients must first acquire reassurance that

they have sufficient interpersonal potency apart from extra
personal endeavors; that they can achieve "success" and
status in relation to others and are held in positive regard
or in a position of being lovable not just for what they can
accomplish, but also because of what they can be in relation
to others.
To service the client's magical wish, there should be
an attempt to restructure a fail-safe system which has become
increasingly dysfunctional so that it becomes more functional
for the client.

In this regard, one suggestion is to struc

ture opportunities for clients to achieve assurances of their
interpersonal potency and impact within the context of their
more compulsive,

achievement-oriented environment.

For

example, a therapist could be instrumental in helping the
client arrange for the client's spouse and/or other signifi
cant others to become more involved in the client's extra
personal affairs and perhaps to attempt to structure in
occasions when interpersonal interactions with these others
could occur within the context of the compulsive modes
helping the client with a project related to the j o b ) .
implemented effectively,

(e.g.,
If

this tact would be responsive to

the conditional terms of the client's magical wish involving
a desire to retain the aura of self-adequacy and self
significance provided by the compulsive-oriented environment
and, at the same time, provide opportunities for the client
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to achieve interpersonal assurances.

In addition,

it may be

helpful for such clients to inculcate the cognitive precept
which involves the notion that since they have worked so hard
and effectively for so long, they have a right to "cash in"
by beginning to permit themselves to rest on their laurels.
That is, a therapist might attempt to help the client— in
particular, the retiring individual— focus on the accomplish
ments of the past dimension of experience for buttressing
psychological security and rely less upon future-oriented
experiences.
Reactive depression and grief reaction patterns.

From

the viewpoint of the model, reactive depression and grief
reactions are emotional adjustments that tend to occur when
persons experience a serious threat to psychological security
within their actual conditions and are unable to counteract
this threat effectively by means of a shift towards the fantasied,

future dimension of experience.

Precipitous changes,

such as those associated with the death or separation of an
object to which much of an individual's psychological security
is based, evoke this kind of emotional adjustment.

The loss

or unavailability of such an important object leaves a kind
of vacuum for the individual because an important source for
achieving positive outcomes is removed.

The loss or unavail

ability not only affects a person's reliance on the positive
outcomes resulting from actual, ongoing interactions with
that object, but it also impairs the capacity to generate
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the future experiences related to fantasied interactions
with that object.
There are only two ways in which a person can attempt
to counteract this threat to psychological security, but both
ways depend on the person's ability to maintain the effec
tiveness of a shift to fantasied,

future experiences for

achieving positive outcomes in lieu of the present, actual
loss of the object.
validity of future,

The person attempts to preserve the
fantasied experiences with that object

by denying that the loss is permanent,

and, consequently,

the object's expected return salvages the validity of these
fantasy experiences.

Otherwise,

restructure the future,

the person attempts to

fantasy dimension of experience so

that its validity no longer depends upon the return of the
lost object, but instead depends upon the replacement of
the lost object with another, or others.
The attributes associated with grief and depression cor
respond to an individual's development of a fail-safe system
which is designed to facilitate the effectiveness of main
taining a shift toward the fantasied,

future dimension of

experience to counteract the threat to psychological security
occurring as a function of the actual loss of the object.
Furthermore, there generally occur four stages or phases in
a grief or depressive reaction, and, as a person moves
through these four stages, there is a gradual transformation
in the type of fail-safe features used by the person to
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preserve psychological security in light of the loss or
separation associated with an important object.

Applying

the notion extended by Principle #3, grief and depression
remain as a functional set of fail-safe features to the
degree that it permits the individual to move through the
four stages of the emotional adjustment.

These four stages

are enumerated below.
The first phase, the immobilization sta g e , involves the
precipitous loss or separation of a very significant object.
This tends to represent a serious threat to psychological
security since the individual has lost an established source
for acquiring positive outcomes which had demonstrated the
capacity to maintain a strong position of significance to
that object.

Not only has the individual lost such a primary

source within actual conditions of interactions, but the loss
extends to the future,

fantasied dimension of experience

which relies a great deal on the perception of the avail
ability of the lost object in the future.

It is during this

stage that the individual feels helpless, confused,
without direction.

and

In a very real sense, the person has lost

a previously effective channel of acquiring positive outcomes
leading to psychological security.

There may be much emoting,

but the most predominant clinical feature associated with
this stage of the grief or depression reaction is regression.
The individual becomes immobilized and confused, not being
able to plan or organize from moment to moment, nor from day
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to day.
It is the implications of the precipitous loss of the
object which become the source of profound threat to persons'
psychological security.

Persons strive to secure the precept

that they are capable of maintaining a desired position of
significance in relation to certain others because it means
that they have a responsive and reliable set of sources for
acquiring the fulfillment of biological and psychological
needs.

In effect, the loss or separation represents a severe

threat to psychological security because it suggests to per
sons that they in fact have very little control in maintain
ing such a position of significance.
During the immobilization stage, the individual requires
much structure and support.

The extreme feelings of help

lessness and confusion tend to remain until the person is
able to restructure an effective shift towards the future,
fantasied dimension of experience.
The reinstatement stage is the second phase and is
marked by an attempt to secure a tenable shift to the fan
tasied,

future dimension by underwriting a hope or belief

that the loss of position will be reinstated by the return
of the object or previous relationship to the event in ques
tion.

In this regard, the felt immobilization is gradually

replaced by the following modes of psychological slack used
to secure the effectiveness of such a shift.
There tends to be much obsessive behavior as the

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n of th e cop yrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

125
individual becomes preoccupied with regaining the lost
object's presence and impact.

The hope for restoration of

the previous position of significance leads to an attempt to
institute a fail-safe system of performance, which becomes
retroactive, to account for why the position of significance
was lost.

This corresponds to a tendency to become very

self-critical and self-effacing and a tendency to perceive
that the loss occurred as a reprisal for not having been
fully committed to maintaining a strong position of signif
icance to the lost object.
This stage of the depressive reaction becomes similar
to the pattern of the passive-dependent individual
sidered in later discussion).

(con

The self-deprecation and

self-punishment serve two objectives with regard to counter
acting the threat to psychological security associated with
the loss of position of significance.

First of all, these

underwrite the individual's attempt to demonstrate that the
loss of this position in relation to the object occurred
because of the failure on the part of the individual to sus
tain sufficient commitment.
only shown more love,"

"I was such a fool,"

"if I had

"if I had only been there more when

he/she needed me," and other self-effacing thought trends
permit the person to shift to the fantasied, future dimension
which allows the restoration of a strong position of signifi
cance to the lost object to exist since greater commitment
will be demonstrated in the future, upon the object's return.
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Secondly, this tendency to introject blame and engage
in self-denial and self-sacrifice, an anhedonic posture, is
also an attempt to demonstrate just how much impact and sig
nificance the object has in relation to the person, as if to
answer the object's reprisal associated with not having shown
this before the loss or separation occurred.

Ultimately, the

individual hopes that this demonstration will reaffirm to the
lost object that, indeed, much significance is assigned to it
and that it is very special and unique.
It is suspected that most individuals who enter into
psychotherapy due to a depressive reaction tend to be within
this stage of the pattern.

As clients, these individuals

tend to focus a great deal of attention and emphasis on seek
ing reinstatement of the previous positions held in relation
to the lost objects.

Initially,

therapists will encounter

much resistance on the part of their clients if the thera
pists attempt to intervene in such a way as to "demand" that
their clients relinquish the beliefs or hopes for reinstate
ment.

Instead,

clients'

the most effective approach is to accept

desires to engage in the self-effacing patterns.

The reasoning behind this is explained in considering the
third stage of the depressive reaction pattern.
In the third phase, the depreciation sta g e , the features
associated with the reinstatement stage continue until the
individual has developed enough of a basis to restructure
this fail-safe system.

This conversion is characterized by

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n of th e cop yrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

127
changing a fail-safe system which relies on an introjective
mode

(i.e., self-effacement,

punishment)

self-sacrifice, and self

to a fail-safe system which is underwritten by a

projective mode

(i.e., externalization of blame and devalua

tion of the lost object).

This transformation occurs as the

individual's implicit demands for reinstatement to the previ
ous position to the lost object continue to go unanswered.
After all, if the lost object is in fact so special and
important, would it allow the individual to suffer so much
and be so much in need of the object's presence, and still
desert the person?
Thus, the characteristics associated with the reinstate
ment phase set the stage for the individual to establish
implicit demands relating to the object's return, and when
these demands are not met,

it permits the individual to be

in a position of being able to discredit the lost object.
This is why it was suggested that in psychotherapy the client
who appears to manifest the features associated with the
reinstatement phase of the reaction should be permitted to
continue and,

if possible,

to intensify the felt loss and

despondency in the absence of the object's presence.

It is

suggested that a therapist should hold in abeyance any
attempts directed at reversing the self-effacing trend of the
client until the client is "ready" to acknowledge the anger
and frsutration related to the object's apparent indifference
to the client's suffering.

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n of th e cop yrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

128
The depreciation stage corresponds to instituting a
shift to the fantasied,

future dimension of experience which

is no longer dependent upon the reinstatement to the previous
position in relation to the lost object, but involves the
replacement of that object with another, or others.

In order

to underwrite this fail-safe system in light of the recent
loss of a position of significance, the individual begins to
devalue the significance of that previous relationship.
Apparently, since the lost object was not responsive to the
extreme suffering and need for reinstatement, the individual
begins to institute a kind of "sour grapes" approach in
reevaluating just how important that relationship had been.
The person begins to adopt the notion that perhaps he/she
really had imputed much more value to the lost object than
justified,

in particular,

in light of the failure of the

object to appear in the person's hour of need.

This, in

turn, leads to the person formulating the conclusion that
the significance of the relationship with the lost object
was,

in retrospect, not justified, and the depreciation of

that significance begins to gradually intensify.

It is at

this point that the individual tends to engage in the expres
sion of anger and resentment towards that object for deceiv
ing and betraying the individual,

and the "pedestal" upon

which the person had previously placed the object is removed.
The transformed fail-safe system corresponding to the
depreciation stage is that the individual assumes that the
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capacity to sustain a strong position of significance in
relation to objects was not invalidated by the loss of the
object.

Instead,

the person assumes that the relationship

had been flawed by the nature of the object itself, that is,
the object and/or the circumstances of the relationship are
discredited.
As the transformation to the fail-safe features asso
ciated with the depreciation stage becomes more crystallized,
the individual is able to rely on a shift towards the fan
tasied,

future dimension of experience.

This corresponds to

the final phase, the restructuring s t a g e , which depicts that
strong positions of significance in relation to other objects
can occur since the loss encountered previously was based on
external deficiencies,

apart from the person's capacity to

sustain a relationship itself.

The restructuring stage cor

responds to the recovery aspects of a depressive reaction as
the individual begins to replace the lost object in the fan
tasied,

future dimension of experience with another, or others.

Typically,

the four stages correspond to the development

of functional fail-safe systems utilized by individuals to
counteract the threats to psychological security associated
with the precipitous loss or separation of significant
objects and/or events.

With regard to psychotherapy,

it is

proposed that therapists should attempt to identify the stage
or phase of the depressive reaction and, rather than attempt
to help the client forestall or avoid the features associated
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with the particular stage, therapists should instead accom
modate the client's desire to experience the particular set
of feelings and attitudes of that particular phase.
over,

More

it is suspected that the time needed by a particular

individual to achieve psychological recovery from a grief or
depressive reaction tends to be protracted when either the
individual or others are not willing to permit the individual
to be depressed.
Passive-aggressive p a t terns.

From the theoretical

framework of the model, the fail-safe features associated
with the passive-aggressive pattern and the antisocial pat
tern, which is the next clinical pattern presented, are very
similar.

Both employ modes of psychological slack which are

utilized to underwrite feelings and attitudes of indifference
to trying to develop a strong position of significance in
relation to certain objects and/or events.
The more pronounced antisocial pattern is viewed as an
adjustment to experiencing outright rejection from others and
a well-engrained self-doubt as to the capacity to maintain
a strong position of significance to certain classes of
objects.

In relative contrast to this situation, the passive-

aggressive pattern is a fail-safe system developed as a means
of adjusting to the "incompleteness" or the tenuous nature of
positions of significance to objects.

Historically, the

individual has "almost" acquired strong positions of signif
icance to certain objects but has frequently fallen just a
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bit short of meeting the demands and expectations required
for sustaining the desired positions of significance.

The

individual had to try a little bit harder in future attempts
to achieve the completeness of being loved and well regarded
but then, again,

seemed to fall just a bit short.

Consequently, the fail-safe system associated with the
passive-aggressive pattern reflects a person's dilemma
resulting from such a situation.

The individual is led to

hope that the capacity to sustain a strong position of sig
nificance exists but seldom is led to know that such a capa
city exists in relation to certain objects.

Thus, there is

sufficient hope to underwrite some degree of commitment to
attempt to gain acceptance and approval toward strengthening
positions of significance to certain objects.

However, not

having sufficient confidence in the capacity initiates enough
desire to retain some modes of psychological slack close at
hand which can be utilized to underwrite reductions in the
degree of commitment towards such attempts at establishing
and/or maintaining a strong position of significance in rela
tion to these objects.
The fail-safe features associated with the passiveaggressive pattern tend to be a pervasive clinical syndrome
in the sense that it epitomizes the concept of the magical
wish.

That is, it is a desire, on one hand, to achieve cer

tain assurances, but, on the other hand, a wish to avoid the
degree of commitment required to achieve them for fear of
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losing the effectiveness of relying on the shift to the fan
tasied future for such assurances.

As such, the fail-safe

characteristics of the passive-aggressive pattern tend to
also be attending features of individuals who utilize the
characteristics associated with the other clinical patterns
being considered.
In psychotherapy, a client who exhibits passive
aggressiveness tends to evoke much counter-resistance on the
part of therapists.

The complementary response to passive-

aggressive behavior tends to be passive-aggressive behavior
in return.

That is, since the passive-aggressive pattern

reflects an attempt to withhold commitment, the response
tends to represent an attempt to build in some fail-safe
features to discount the outcomes related to being rebuffed
by the individual.

A passive-aggressive client attempts to

withhold commitment to the psychotherapy relationship by
avoiding any sustained performance towards achieving levels
of intimate interactions.

Since anger is one of the most

potent ways to demonstrate interpersonal commitment,

the

passive-aggressive individual attempts to avoid demonstrating
anger.

For example,

it is not uncommon for someone to desire

to elicit jealousy or anger from another individual as a way
of reaffirming the degree of commitment and the degree of
significance the individual has in relation to the other
person.

The client tends to restrict the level of interac

tions by externalizing the focus to issues such as wishing
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to know why certain events

(as if the client was dissociated

from their occurrence) have occurred in the past and present
conditions.

There is a related tendency for the client to

stipulate many times in the interactions that he/she is
unable to "understand," and when the therapist attempts to
provide such understanding for the client, the client invari
ably rejects or withholds a degree of acceptance of the
explanation.

In this way, the client is able to devalue the

impact and significance of the therapist in relation to the
client's needs.

In response to being made to feel ineffec

tual and inept, the therapist tends to adopt an emotional
adjustment of indifference or, in short, a passive-aggressive
posture towards the client.

That is, after a while, a thera

pist withholds making a sustained commitment to performance
so as to build in some fail-safe features to counteract
against the threat of feeling ineffectual and unable to
achieve a strong position of significance in relation to the
client.

Again, in order to underwrite this indifference, the

therapist tends to suppress and/or repress the anger felt
towards the client since this would betray the fact that in
actuality the client is having an impact on the therapist.
From the point of view of the model,

it is this unwillingness

to permit the client to "know" that he/she is that signifi
cant to the therapist which perpetuates the resistance asso
ciated with the passive-aggressive pattern of the client.
The general terms of the passive-aggressive client's
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magical wish tend to be:

"I want to have impact and signif

icance in relation to others by gaining acceptance and
approval from them, but I do not wish to acknowledge my
attempt to do so.

It would destroy the validity of my fan

tasies which suggest that when I try to achieve acceptance
and approval, I am capable of having impact on others."
Given the presumed terms of such a magical wish, one of the
most effective responses to this magical wish is for thera
pists to express their anger and frustration at the client
with regard to feeling ineffectual and impotent in their
attempt to be significant to, and have impact upon, the
client.

Such expressed anger reveals to the client that

he/she is capable of generating hurt and anger in others
because they want to care for and respond to him/her.
has historically occurred,

in contrast,

What

is that others have

reacted by not showing their vulnerability in relation to
the client's significance to them, but instead have conveyed
an indifference to acquiring a position of significance in
relation to the client.
Antisocial

(sociopathic) p a t terns.

Individuals exhibit

ing pronounced antisocial patterns operate from fail-safe
systems which account for actual experiences of felt rejec
tion by intentionally provoking these rejections through
disregard for others, selfishness, and deceit.

They adopt

attitudes and behaviors which bespeak their outright indif
ference to wanting to attain a desired position of

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n o f th e copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

135
significance in relation to certain others

(most often,

parental figures).
As suggested earlier, the features of this fail-safe
system are similar to those associated with the passiveaggressive pattern.

However,

the intensity of the ambiva

lence or dilemma experienced by the more passive-aggressive
individual is much less so for the antisocial.

Whereas the

passive-aggressive individual is constantly involved in a
conflict between wanting to sustain commitment towards
acquiring a strong position of significance in relation to
others and a desire, at the same time,
mitment, the more pronounced antisocial

to withhold such com
(sociopathic)

indi

vidual attempts to underwrite a fail-safe system which denies
the former aspect of the conflict.
The modes of psychological slack corresponding to the
antisocial personality pattern are developed,

and tend to

become engrained developmentally, when a child and/or adoles
cent experiences longstanding periods of rejection by paren
tal figures.

In contrast to the situation depicted in the

discussion of the passive-aggressive pattern,

in which the

person "almost" achieves a strong position of significance
in relation to such figures,

the antisocial pattern corre

sponds to a situation in which individuals experienced a
more outright sense of rejection by such figures.

In order

to provide a means of discounting the validity of these nega
tive outcomes, the young individuals begin to act out in a
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parental figures.

This fail-safe system permits persons to

shift to the fantasied,

future dimension of experiences which

depicts that when these individuals try to behave in ways
which foster acceptance and approval, their capacity to be
special and lovable can be demonstrated.
For these individuals,

the resistance to relinquishing

these modes of psychological slack, which underlie the anti
social pattern, is attached to the fear that rejection will
remain as an omnipresent feature despite commitment towards
acceptance and approval.
Given the need to develop a strong fail-safe system to
compensate for these rather strong self-doubts,

these persons

tend to underwrite their fail-safe systems by striving to
establish attitudes and preferences designed to give impetus
to the rejection of conventional modes and norms for inter
acting.

This striving underlies the projective-blame mechan

ism and externalization of shortcomings to perceived
inequities and inadequacies of environmental conditions.

It

allows the individual to feel disenfranchised by the main
stream of society, to justify behavior accordingly.

Because

the person has been unable to establish a strong position of
significance in relation to parental figures and within the
normative peer population,

the person seeks out affiliation

within more marginal segments of the population where it is
easier to compete for such a position.

Rather than risk
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further threats to their fantasied capacity to be held in
regard by certain o ther s , such persons attempt to underwrite
feelings and attitudes of indifference towards desiring
acceptance from these objects.

One of the most effective

ways of underwriting an attitude of indifference to estab
lishing and maintaining a position of significance in rela
tion to a particular object is to exploit it.

That is,

generally, the prohibition against exploiting others is that
the reprisal from others involves a loss of a position of
significance in relation to them.

Thus, the antisocial per

son who exploits and abuses objects is attempting to demon
strate his/her indifference to the outcomes associated with
such reprisals.

Again, this is done to underwrite effec

tively a fail-safe system which allows such individuals to
affirm in their fantasied dimension of experience that they
can be special and significant to others, but they really do
not care to.
Generally,

the antisocial or sociopathic individual is

not prone to seek psychotherapy and tends to encounter psy
chotherapy as related to substance abuse programs and/or
treatment programs associated with incarceration.

The gen

eral terms associated with the magical wish in relation to
the client who features sociopathic trends are as follows:
"I want to be lovable and special to someone, but I do not
want to make myself vulnerable to the threat of rejection by
acknowledging and committing myself towards acquiring such
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a position of significance."
Given these general terms of a client's magical wish,
there is a tendency for much counter-resistance to develop
in psychotherapy since the client will tend to exhibit hos
tility and/or indifference to the process.

It is often dif

ficult for therapists not to institute their own fail-safe
features in response to the client and, unwittingly or other
wise, exacerbate the source of resistance associated with the
conditional terms of the magical wish.
ate this source of resistance,
willing to invest emotionally

In short, to attenu

a therapist must be able and
(i.e., approach levels of

intimacy on a gradual bas i s ) , without demanding the client
to reciprocate during the initial periods involved.
Passive-dependent p a t terns.

Passive-dependent patterns

tend to remain quite resistant to behavior change because of
the nature of the modes of psychological slack the individual
utilizes to underwrite the fail-safe system.

The individual

develops the characterological traits of self-effacement,
submissiveness, self-sacrifice,

and humility and invests much

energy in demonstrating these attributes to others.

Appear

ing ineffectual and helpless are part of a self-deprecating
process which, on the surface, might appear to contradict the
theoretical proposition that persons attempt to discount the
validity of actual interactions which indicate inadequate
performance capacity.
In the case of passive-dependent individuals, the
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self-deprecation permits them to account for why others even
tually reject them, ensuring the effectiveness of shifts
toward the fantasied,

future dimension of experience.

Upon

initial contact, the passive-dependent tends to evoke nurture
and recognition from another person by making the other per
son feel so valuable and potent, by virtue of the power of
the person's presence in relation to the passive-dependent
individual.

This aspect is very similar to the stage of a

grief or depression reaction in which the person attempts to
achieve reinstatement of a lost object or established source
of positive outcomes by flattering the object, by indicating
how much significance and impact the loss has had on the
person.

The conciliatory, gracious posture along with the

self-devaluing comments invariably elicit support and affec
tion from the other person— initially.

In time, however, the

the selfless, utilitarian sacrifices the individual has made,
the vesting of trust in this other person, are repaid not
with kindness but with rejection and abandonment.

In a

sense, the individual implicitly expects and demands so much
back because the individual has "given" so much that invari
ably the other person will fall short.

At this juncture, the

other person, who begins to feel overwhelmed and smothered by
these implicit demands which have begun to surface in the
relationship, wants to renege or withdraw.
There is a tendency for the other person to become
rejecting, to withhold affection and recognition in a
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desperate attempt to be removed from the "pedestal" upon
which the person initially permitted the individual to place
him/her.
At this point, the individual begins to exert the fail
safe effects provided by the passive-dependency.

What kind

of person would betray, exploit, and abuse another person
after that other person had sacrificed so much, and dedicated
so much energy to fulfilling present and future aspirations
with the person?

Only one kind of person would do that— an

exploitive or abusive person.

To even further underwrite the

inequity and inadequacy of these conditions,

the passive-

dependent tends to become suicidally depressed and withdrawn,
as if to demonstrate how cruel and uncaring some persons can
be.
Despite the felt psychological pain and discomfort asso
ciated with the outright rejection and loss of position of
significance to another person, the passive-dependent applies
the fail-safe system in the following manner.

The reason the

person was unable to demonstrate the capacity to sustain a
strong position of significance was because the person never
had such a position, but was duped into believing otherwise.
The individual begins to recognize that he/she is the victim
of a pathological and predatory person and may confide that
although this was suspected to have been the case,

the other

person deserved a chance to reveal otherwise.
This facilitates the ability to discount cognitively the

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n o f th e copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

141
validity of those negative outcomes on the basis that these
occurred in relation to a person who, by nature,
tive and deceitful.
the fantasied,

Then,

is exploita

the effectiveness of a shift to

future dimension is ensured as a means of

reinstating the loss of psychological security as a result of
the negative outcomes associated with the actual rejection.
As the individual is attempting to "rebound" from the
most recent experience of rejection,

it is usually not too

long before the person finds another "rescuer," and the cycle
continues:

The individual relates how badly the other person

hurt him/her despite the affection and loyalty bestowed upon
that person, and what an ineffectual,
ual must really be.

inept fool the individ

Responding in a complementary fashion,

the rescuer assures the individual with statements which con
tradict the passive-dependent's self-deprecations.
immediately,

Almost

the passive-dependent assigns a great deal of

significance and validity to the sympathetic person.

This

self-perpetuating pattern of going from one rescuer to
another is similar to the concept related by the "rescue tri
angle," which is a concept used in transactional analysis
(Steiner, 1974).
It is suggested that in psychotherapy the therapist is
often viewed as a potential "rescuer" by the passivedependent client who, in most cases, is at the depths of
despair and self-pity.

The therapist,

initially, has a ten

dency to invest a great deal in this client, in response to
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attempting to fulfill the demand and expectation of being
omnipotent and extremely significant in relation to the
client.
There is a tendency for a therapist to operate in the
direction of responding to the expressed terms of the cli
ent's magical wish, which is to acquire greater self-esteem,
self-respect, and autonomy.

However, unless a therapist is

able to recognize and respond to the unspoken conditional
terms of this magical wish, a therapist tends to soon become
frustrated by the client's resistance and setbacks in rela
tion to the interventions intended to meet the expressed
terms of this magical wish.
The general conditional terms of the magical wish are
that the passive-dependent does not wish to relinquish the
fail-safe features, that is, being extremely conciliatory,
self-sacrificing,

and overly deferential to conforming to

behavior which meets the wishes of others, underwriting the
ability to be "victimized" by the predatory individuals of
the world.

Without these modes of psychological slack, how

could the client discount the validity of actual outcomes
associated with being rejected and abandoned by those whom
the client served so well?
Thus, the passive-dependent client tends to exhibit much
resistance to attempts to induce more autonomous,

assertive,

and aggressive patterns of interpersonal interactions until
another fail-safe system can be developed to ensure the
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effectiveness of shifts toward the fantasied,

future dimen

sion of experience to compensate for actual rebuffs and
rejections.

Instead of attempting to contradict or redirect

the client's expressed self-deprecation and statements per
taining to inadequacy, a therapist should concur and respond
to the client as if the client were a helpless,

inept child.

Then, the therapist should begin to discuss with the client
arrangements such as institutionalization and other extreme
care-taking devices until the client resists these intended
interventions.
Paranoid patterns.

In order for fail-safe systems to

remain effective at insuring the validity of certain future,
fantasied experiences against the threat of negative actual
outcomes, persons must be able to underwrite these systems
with sufficient modes of psychological slack.

Within this

theoretical framework, paranoid patterns represent individ
uals' desperate attempts to structure into their actual con
ditions of performance certain circumstances which are not,
in fact, operating, but ones which then provide modes of
psychological slack required to underwrite effective fail
safe systems.
"Normal" fail-safe systems are generated by structuring
into actual conditions of performance consensually validated
bases upon which the validity of certain outcomes can be dis
counted.

Delusional trends of thought provide persons with

fail-safe features which are not consensually validated to
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exist, but are nevertheless perceived by such individuals.
Thus, when individuals are unable to underwrite effec
tively their fail-safe systems within the context of actual
conditions of performance,

they tend to engender these con

ditions with attributes which can serve such a purpose.
thermore,

Fur

it is assumed as a corollary proposition that when

persons are not able to discount the validity of the absence
of positive actual outcomes by utilizing a mild degree of
delusional perception of their actual conditions of perfor
mance, greater degrees of delusion are required, correspond
ing to the observed variability in the degree of clinical
manifestations of this pattern.
In order for individuals to maintain the basis underly
ing a particular delusional trend, they tend to direct much
of their behavior toward validating this basis.

Consequently,

the paranoid person not only becomes concerned with defending
against the perceived threats existing in actual conditions
of interactions, but, in addition, becomes preoccupied with
ensuring that the presence of such threats remains.
This rather paradoxical approach underlies the basis for
the general terms of the magical wish associated with the
paranoid pattern.

The expressed term usually involves a

desire to eliminate or remove the sources of the perceived
circumstances which are held to be the obstacles or threats
to achieving certain positions of significance in actual,
ongoing experiences.

However, the conditional term of the

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n of th e cop yrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

145
magical wish is concerned with acquiring sufficient assur
ances that if these threats or obstacles are removed, the
individual will retain enough psychological slack to pursue
actual interactions in lieu of relinquishing the delusional
trends.
Therefore, the objectives of psychotherapy relative to
treating this clinical pattern are twofold.

First of all,

the client's delusional system should not be undermined until
the client is able to integrate another, more functional sys
tem for providing psychological slack.

It is assumed here

that the delusional aspects provide the fail-safe features
needed to justify why certain actual outcomes are occurring
and/or why certain interactions are being avoided by the
client.

Given this assumption,

if a therapist can provide

another justification which permits the client to forestall
attempts directed toward certain actual performances, the
client tends to be less resistant to relinquishing these
delusional aspects, at least temporarily.
The next step would be to establish with the client a
functional fail-safe system which would permit the client to
be in a position to experience some positive outcomes in the
area of actual performance which the delusional trends had
previously precluded.

This step is not directed at revealing

to the client that the perceived threats are in fact not
present, but, instead, to reveal to the client that there is
no longer a need to perceive such threats.

It is suggested
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that therapists frequently tend to direct their efforts
toward demonstrating to the paranoid individual that there
is no basis for the particular delusional thinking before
assuring the client that he/she no longer needs to generate
such a basis.
Schizophrenic patterns.
tional

(nonorganically based)

According to the model,

func

schizophrenic process occurs in

situations where persons have been subjected to profound
threats to their psychological security and are unable to
counteract such threats with the "available" fail-safe fea
tures inherent in their actual conditions of performance.
The psychosis aspect represents an attempt to generate the
dimension of actual experiences from the fantasy dimension,
independent of the actual conditions which are consensually
validated to exist for the individual.
The primary objective of the person is to render the
potential impact of actual objects and events as insignifi
cant, and therefore to withhold assigning validity to the
outcomes which might result from interactions within such
actual conditions.

By breaking down the process of consen

sually validated communication with actual objects, such
individuals have removed themselves from any commitments to
performance designed to establish positions of significance
in relation to these objects.

Instead, psychological

security is derived from experiences generated in fantasied
dimensions of experience which no longer require a basis
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within actual conditions since these are relegated to having
virtually no validity.
There tends to be much resistance against relinquishing
the psychotic behavior serving as modes of psychological
slack since this underwrites the capacity to undermine the
perception that there exists a set of consensually validated
conditions from which to appraise self-adequacy and inter
personal potency.

This notion is reflected in the general

terms of the magical wish, which is,

"I wish others could

understand me and then be available for interacting with me."
The conditional terms of this magical wish tend to be,

"but

I want to be assured of my capacity to be significant and
potent in relation to others before I allow their presence to
be acknowledged and permit them to understand me."
Traditional modalities

(i.e., verbal interchange,

attempts at cognitive restructuring, and insight and aware
ness techniques)

tend to remain ineffectual since they are

antithetical responses to the conditional terms of this magi
cal wish.

Rehabilitative psychotherapy, as opposed to main

tenance procedures, cannot counteract the source of resistance
associated with the conditional terms unless the process per
mits the client to achieve interpersonal status without having
to relinquish the psychosis.

Perhaps the most effective way

of complying with this injunction is for the therapist
or others)

(and/

to give the client importance and status by

"learning" the language of the client rather than insisting
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that the client let go of the fail-safe features by having
to accept and acknowledge the significance of others on
their terms.
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CHAPTER IV
The Hypothetical Case of Ms. C
Although Chapter III discusses application of the model,
a clearer understanding of its application may be provided by
presenting the following hypothetical case, influenced by
Erickson's work

(cited in Haley,

1973).

The client in this hypothetical case is a 21-year-old
college student who is self-referred.
Ms. C is visibly agitated

Upon initial contact,

(i.e., digging her fingernails into

her hands, glancing about the room, heavily perspiring hands,
etc.).

Ms. C's speech pattern is somewhat flat in affect.

However, the intensity of her feelings is revealed in her
facial expression.

As she describes it, for the past several

months she has been extremely depressed and confused, and she
lately has been contemplating suicide.

She states that she

has "reached the end of her rope" and does not know what to
do.

Upon further inquiry,

it is learned that this young

woman grew up with only one sibling,
than Ms. C.

a brother 2 years older

Although her parents have never been physically

separated in terms of the marital relationship,
theless has been much turmoil between them.

there never

Ms. C. describes

her mother as a chronic alcoholic and her father as a very
hard-working man.

She goes on to state that in recent years

her mother has required a great deal of support and attention
149
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and has experienced some extreme mood swings, exhibiting
behavior which is very regressed in nature.

Ms. C's father

has nearly "gone crazy" trying to maintain the household
intact, according to the client.

She states that much of her

problem involves a conflict between meeting parental demands
within the home— in particular, indulging her mother— and her
desire on the other hand to pursue her own goals socially and
academically at college.

She has been given to extreme feel

ings of guilt, she says, if she attempts to direct her energy
away from the parental home, but feels extremely lonely and
"out of it" at college

(where she has a dorm room) because

she has so little time to pursue activities there.

Over the

past several months her academic performance has been slip
ping, and she finds her attempts to study almost futile since
she is no longer able to concentrate and tends to become
extremely agitated.

She has had almost no contact in recent

times with any of her acquaintances at college and has found
herself withdrawing, becoming reclusive.
In a second session with Ms. C, the content begins to
focus upon her feelings about her position in relation to her
parents and older brother.

She relates an incident that she

believes to have occurred when she was approximately 7 years
old and apparently having some serious trouble adjusting to
school.

She remembers overhearing her mother and father dis

cussing how her older brother is so much brighter and more
capable than his sister.

She also recalls her mother saying
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on that occasion something to the effect that she wished
that "your daughter had never been born," and her father
replying,

"But she was."

As she continues to reminisce about

her childhood, she concludes that she believes her parents
really love her, but, because of marital problems, they have
been unable to express their love to her.
floor and begins to cry.

Ms. C looks at the

A few moments later,

she states

that she was hoping that going away to college would have
permitted her to escape the pain she felt at home and that
she could start her life over again at that point.

However,

she states that she did not anticipate that, between her
having to work on a part-time job as well as attend to her
felt obligations at home, she would be unable to fulfill
this hope.
The therapist in this hypothetical case, Mr. T, attempts
to discern the terms of Ms. C's magical wish.

This procedure

corresponds to Principle #1 in the application of the model,
that is, identifying the terms of a client's magical wish.
He assumes that Ms. C's agitated depression is an emotional
adjustment which serves to underwrite her withdrawal from
interpersonal interactions at college.

The persistence of

the depression and withdrawal are not viewed as sustained
reactions or unresolved feelings.

Instead, these symptoms

are perceived as part of a proactive adjustment which pro
vides fail-safe features to maintain the validity of future,
fantasied outcomes in light of the absence of certain actual
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positive outcomes.
The following exchange between Mr. T and Ms. C underlies
the therapist's attempt to determine both the expressed terms
of the client's magical wish and the conditional terms.

The

expressed terms correspond to the kinds of actual assurances
(positive outcomes) Ms. C is seeking to counteract the threat
to her psychological security.

This threat occurs because of

the increasing ineffectiveness of shifts to her future,

fan

tasied dimension of experience for bolstering psychological
security since the validity of these fantasied outcomes is
becoming less tenable.

The conditional terms correspond to

Ms. C's desire to retain modes of psychological slack needed
to underwrite a fail-safe system to account
not yet in a position
desires.

for why she is

to achieve the actual assurances she

The source of resistance which Ms. C brings into

psychotherapy is associated with the conditional terms.
Ms. C's responses in the exchange relate primarily to
the expressed terms of her magical wish.

It is only after

Mr. T pursues a certain line of inquiry that the nature of
the conditional terms becomes evident.
Mr. T:

You seem
to be so caught
gations— work, school, and
your parents' needs— there
left to participate in the
enjoy.

up in your obli
attending to
is little time
activities you

Ms. C:

I just don't have any more energy to keep
going this way, but what can I do?

Mr. T:

Somehow, you did not expect life to be so
cumbersome at age 21; that a young woman
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in college would not be able to go to
parties, meet people, and perhaps find
a few exciting men.
Ms. C:
Mr.

T: Well, even though you
feel that way, it
seems that something has prevented you
from resigning to that, so far.

Ms. C:
Mr. T:

Ms.

If life for me is like it has been, I
might as well crawl into a hole and die.

I guess I've been holding out for things
to change.
I keep hoping.
I keep praying.
Tell me.
What do you pray for? What do
you hope will happen to prevent you from
crawling further into
that hole and dying?

C: First of all, I would
like to see my parents
happy.
Then I want to graduate and work;
maybe not work for the rest of my life.
Maybe I will get married and have some kids.

Mr. T:

What is going to make your future marriage
happy?

Ms. C:

Being a good wife and mother.

Mr. T:

Being someone special to your future husband
and children?

Ms. C:

Yes.
(She laughs nervously and then appears
somber as she looks down at the floor.)

Mr. T:

It's kind of frightening to sometimes think
that no matter what happens between your
parents you still might feel alone and sad.

Ms. C:

I guess I'm not sure that any guy would
really be interested in me.
I mean as far
as a deep relationship.

Mr. T:

I think what you are saying is that you hope
you won't continue to feel alone and not spe
cial and lovable to others who might become
special to you, but you really don't know
what will happen.
Since you have been away at
college, you still haven't had the opportunity
to assure yourself that this will happen.

Ms. C:

I don't know anything now.
I'm going crazy.

All I know is that
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Mr.

?:

If it were not for your obligations to
your parents, especially your mother, what
could be different for you now?

Ms.

::

Well, I'd be able to concentrate on my
schoolwork and get good grades.

Mr.

':

I'm sure that would be nice, but would that
counteract your feelings of loneliness?

Ms.

!:

I'd also have more time to make friends at
school.
Mark [her brother] goes to Michigan
State University, and he hardly ever comes
home or takes any responsibility at home.

Mr. T

Your parents must be extremely upset with
Mark's selfish preoccupation with his own
life.

Ms. C :

That's the funny thing!
No matter what Mark
does or doesn't do, he is the greatest thing
on earth as far as my mother and father are
concerned.

Mr. T : Isn't it frustrating to you that Mark is
enjoying college at the expense of leaving
your parents to fend for themselves, and here
you are trying to rescue your parents from a
miserable life, and they still don't appreci
ate you?
Ms. C : The way you say that makes me sound like a
martyr.
Mr. T :

There is nothing wrong with being a martyr
if it makes you happy.

Ms. C : (She becomes visibly angry at the therapist.)
But I am not happy!
I feel like I want to
kill myself!
Mr. T : Then it seems to me that your parents better
get their lives in order before you end up
killing yourself.
Ms. C : (Appearing frustrated, she begins to cr y . )
It is my life that I want to straighten out.
I get so mad at times, I just want to scream!
Mr. T :

Why are you wanting to scream at me now?
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Ms.

C: Because I want you to help me.
myself.
I'm ugly.
I'm fat.
Nobody will ever want me.

I hate
I'm dumb.

Mr.

T: I feel sorry

Ms.

C: I don't
want you to feel sorry for me.
I want you to care about me.

for you.

Ms. C initially focused on a theme concerned with an
expressed need to resolve her feelings in relation to her
position in the parental home.

She felt rejected and

unwanted, and needed to seek approval and significance from
her parents.

It became apparent to Mr. T that this theme had

become incorporated into Ms. C's fail-safe system.

The

"real" threat to her psychological security was associated
with her fear of risking a shift from her reliance on fan
tasied, future outcomes toward seeking actual outcomes to
maintain the perceived capacity to elicit love and recogni
tion.

In the exchange with Mr. T, she alluded to her fantasy

that such interpersonal significance would be demonstrated
when she went off to college.

Because she was so terrified

that this fantasy would be destroyed,

she developed modes of

psychological slack which kept her isolated and unable to
sustain any commitment toward interacting at college.
As it became apparent in the latter portion of this
interview, Ms. C was finding it difficult to continue to
externalize the basis of her distress to her discordant
familial situation.

Instead, the client began to focus on

how terrified she was that she might not have the capacity
to be significant as an adult,

away from the parental home,
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as her future fantasy experiences had once assured her.
Consequently, the following fail-safe system was placed into
operation.
Ms. C perceived a high level of risk that if she
assigned validity to the actual, ongoing conditions at col
lege and sought verification of her fantasied capacity to be
significant among peers,

she would have destroyed any resid

ual hope for the future.

Therefore, Ms. C desired an effec

tive fail-safe system to avoid risking her fantasies to
reality while still preserving the validity of these future
fantasies.

She wished to ensure that this dimension of

experience remained a viable source for psychological security
in the absence of actual assurances.

The client was able to

underwrite such a fail-safe system by unconsciously develop
ing a set of emotional adjustments to the perceived turmoil
within the parental home.

These emotions corresponded to the

symptoms of her agitated depression and interpersonal with
drawal and were initially effective at permitting the client
to isolate herself at college.

She could not sustain a com

mitment to interpersonal and academic performance because of
the derisive nature of the family problems.
This is not to suggest that Ms. C's concerns are not
real in a phenomenological sense, nor is it contended that
such concerns are unwarranted.

However,

these felt concerns

also persist because of their utility as modes of psycholog
ical slack to underwrite the fail-safe features in the
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manner previously described.
Thus, Mr. T interprets the expressed terms of the cli
ent's magical wish as a desire to achieve interpersonal
recognition and significance at college.

He conjectures that

the conditional terms involve Ms. C's desire to retain an
effective fail-safe system to ensure that the absence of such
achievement can be discounted.

The fail-safe system which

operates presently is dysfunctional since her isolation from
others at college precludes opportunities for achieving the
assurances which she so desperately seeks.
In accordance with Principle #2 in applying the model,
Mr. T prepares to restructure Ms. C's present dysfunctional
fail-safe system to make it more functional.

He remains cog

nizant of the client's fear expressed in the conditional
terms of her magical wish.

Mr. T presumes that the essential

aspect of these terms is Ms. C's desire to be able to dis
count the validity of the absence of positive outcomes in her
ongoing conditions at college.

Mr. T considers two criteria

in attempting to restructure the client's present fail-safe
features.

One criterion is that the modified fail-safe fea

tures must allow for Ms. C to be in positions to interact
with others at college so chances for acquiring the needed
actual assurances are not precluded.

The other criterion is

that the modified fail-safe system must remain effective
enough to insure the validity of her future,

fantasied dimen

sion against the event that negative outcomes occur in
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interactions with others at college.

Otherwise, the client

will resist interventions in therapy designed to fulfill the
expressed terms of her magical wish.
Some traditional therapy approaches would focus on help
ing Ms. C "work through" her feelings concerning the parental
rejection.

Mr. T, however, views the persistence of these

feelings as psychological defenses to underwrite her fail
safe system, permitting Ms. C to isolate herself from others.
Mr. T virtually ignores the issue of the parental situation,
as it will become evident,
with Ms. C.

as he pursues in further sessions

He assumes that Ms. C will permit resolution of

this issue only after it is no longer required to underwrite
her fail-safe system of performance within her actual, ongoing
conditions.
Using hypnotherapy as an adjunct (Ms. C is
found to be an excellent subject), Mr. T proceeds
as follows.
First, Mr. T, as a posthypnotic sug
gestion, advises Ms. C that as she remains depressed
and isolated in her dorm room at college, her appe
tite will decrease accordingly.
While she will be
able to eat enough to remain healthy, she will find
that she is losing about 1 pound between each of the
biweekly therapy sessions.
Second, the client is
instructed that when she begins to feel "bad for her
self" that she should experiment with facial make-up
(Ms. C seldom uses cosmetics). In addition, she is
to apply make-up before each session, so Mr. T can
offer comments and suggestions as to "how it looks"
on her.
No other instructions are given at this
point.
During each of the following 10 biweekly ses
sions, Ms. C is told that, despite her depression
and anxiety over her concerns, she is becoming more
attractive with each pound she loses.
Suggestions
and comments are made regarding her facial make-up,
e.g., to reduce the amount of rouge; how striking
her eyes appear.
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By the tenth such session, Ms. C remarks to
Mr. T that her clothes no longer fit very well,
and she plans to shop for some new clothes.
Mr. T
concurs and suggests that she purchase a pair of
earrings and wear them to the next session.
At the next session, Mr. T observes a marked
change in the client's demeanor.
In contrast to
her previous tendency to slouch in the chair, she
sits straight up.
Her once badly bitten fingers
and nails are in much better shape, with the nails
carefully polished.
She smiles more frequently and
sustains eye contact with Mr. T much more often.
Nevertheless, Ms. C reports that she still ruminates
about her familial situation and still tends to be
reclusive.
However, the intensity of concern or
emotion appears to have been reduced as she describes
these feelings.
Mr. T induces a trance state and conveys the
following instructions to the client:
"When you begin to think about how terrible
things are as you are alone in your room, you
also begin to feel the urge to go out.
The
more depressed you feel, the stronger the urge
becomes to go out of your room.
You may wish
to take a nice, warm, leisurely bath as if you
were getting ready to go out somewhere.
While
bathing, your biggest concern involves select
ing what to wear.
You dress, put on your
make-up, and fix your hair, as if you were
planning to go out.
Finally, you look in the
mirror, and when everything looks just right,
put on those nice earrings that you bought."
A week later, at the next session, Ms. C arrives
in a somewhat silly, puckish mood.
She remarks that
she has a date this evening with a young man she met
in the library the previous afternoon.
Later during
this session, the same instructions as before are
given to the client.
Several weeks later, it is noted that Ms. C's
expressed concerns have shifted from feeling depressed
and withdrawn to apprehension regarding sexual activ
ity in relationships.
It is also of interest to note
that she has inquired of Mr. T about arranging a refer
ral for professional counseling for her parents.
Shortly thereafter, therapy is terminated upon mutual
agreement between Mr. T and Ms. C.
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This hypothetical case illustrated several important
aspects of the model.

First, there were virtually no

attempts to interpret underlying motives to the client.
Although Mr. T, for his own benefit, engaged in analyzing the
unconscious dynamics of Ms. C's fail-safe features and the
terms of her magical wish, it was not necessary for him to
share the process with the client.
Second, Mr. T attempted to respond to the conditional
terms of the client's magical wish by not requiring Ms. C to
relinquish the fail-safe features provided by her state of
depression and withdrawal.

The suggestions and instructions

to the client never "demanded" of the client to acknowledge
a commitment to seek assurances of her interpersonal signif
icance at college.

She was permitted to retain her depres

sion to account for why she was not yet in a position to
fully test out her impact on others.

However, by "pairing"

the depression with an urge to leave her dorm room, the
opportunity for achieving interpersonal recognition and sig
nificance was acquired, without requiring Ms. C to acknow
ledge a commitment to seeking such recognition.
Third, Mr. T attempted to instill confidence in the
client by preparing her for the opportunity to feel physi
cally attractive.

However,

it was left for the client to

decide when to acknowledge attempts to test out the impact
of these attributes.

The instructions never required Ms. C

Lo acknowledge intentions to interact with others, but only
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established the conditions in which such interactions could
occur.

In short, Ms. C was permitted to retain sufficient

fail-safe features to ensure the validity of her fantasied
dimension.

She was prepared to "save face" in the event of

disappointment.
Finally, this hypothetical case reflected one of the
major theoretical propositions of the model.

That is, Ms. C's

resistance was not a function of revivifying past experiences;
rather,

it corresponded to her attempt to secure and maintain

the validity of fantasied,

future experiences.

Ms. C's felt

rejection in relation to her parents corresponded to the fact
that she did not receive adequate assurance from them that
she was capable of being special and significant.

This

threat to her psychological security was counteracted by
generating a future,

fantasied dimension of experiences which

demonstrated her capacity to be significant to others,
despite her actual circumstances.

Mr. T's interventions were

not directed at helping Ms. C to overcome her anxiety
attached to those painful past experiences, because she had
already done that through her fantasy dimension of experience.
However, the therapist did direct his efforts at helping
Ms. C overcome her anxiety and resistance by bolstering the
sagging validity of her future fantasies and restructuring
her dysfunctional fail-safe system.
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CHAPTER V
Summary and Conclusions
The purpose for presenting this alternative theoretical
model for conceptualizing resistance to behavior change is
to propose what is considered to be a primary source of
resistance not emphasized by existing theoretical models.
This alternative model suggests important implications for
clinicians in both the theory and practice of psychotherapy.
To provide a contextual framework in which to present
the model, Chapter I categorizes the existing views of resis
tance into three general theoretical paradigms.

These para

digms are distinguished by how each views a person's past and
present dimensions of experience in determining behavior pat
terns or personality characteristics, and how these dimensions
interrelate to provide sources of resistance to altering such
patterns.
The view which suggests that one's past,

formative expe

riences not only determine one's present modes of relating to
the environment, but also serve to fixate one unconsciously
to persist in these modes,

is represented by Paradigm I.

Psychoanalytic theory reflects this concept, and offers the
most explicit statement about the phenomenon of resistance.
Beyond psychoanalytic theory, the phenomenon only receives
implicit attention within other existing theories of
162
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personality functioning.
Although Paradigm I represents a well-articulated under
standing of resistance,

its reductionistic view fails to

render sufficient import to a more teleological approach,
which considers that persons are oriented towards generating
conditions to meet present and futuristic goals.

In failing

to emphasize this aspect, Paradigm I ignores an important
attribute of resistance.

Several related issues are also

described in what are suggested as theoretical deficiencies
within the concept of resistance represented in Paradigm I.
A concept of resistance which proposes that while past
experiences function to establish behavior patterns, the per
sistence of these patterns occurs in response to present,
ongoing conditions of experience is represented in Paradigm
II.

Many learning theories and their applied models reflect

this proposition.

Persons tend to be viewed as respondents

to environmental conditions.

Those ongoing conditions which

serve to reinforce certain behavior patterns must be altered
in order to counteract the resistance to changing such pat
terns.

Paradigm II fails to consider individuals as active

participants in the selection of the environmental conditions
to which they wish to respond.

That is, it is assumed

implicitly that resistance can be overcome to the extent that
stimulus control can be achieved

(i.e., regulation of inten

sity of reinforcing stimuli and their schedule of occurrence).
It is proposed here, however, that through selective
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attention and the use of fantasy behavior, persons automat
ically exert stimulus control.

Accordingly,

it can be pre

sumed that persons tend to seek out those conditions which
reinforce or support certain behavior patterns, rather than
the reverse process of selecting behaviors which are rein
forced by existing environmental conditions.
sumption is held,

Since this pre

the concept of resistance reflected in

Paradigm II fails to remain tenable.

The discussion in

Chapter I elaborates on this issue.
Paradigm III represents the third existing general con
cept of resistance and emphasizes the individual as assuming
an active role in generating experiences which are integrated
within the phenomenological self.

Resistance is viewed

implicitly as involving the "private logic" or phenomenologi
cal world of a person.

It is not only a function of past

experiences, nor is it dictated by present circumstances
alone.

Instead, resistance represents an interdependent

relationship between past and present experiences.

The pres

ent is perceived within the context of past injunctions and
beliefs about the self, and this significance of the past is
validated in the perception of the present.

From this theo

retical perspective, past experiences define for persons what
they should be, and their present experiences define what
they are in relation to what they should be.

Resistance is

implicitly a function of a person's desire to maintain
integrity of his/her self-concept,

to minimize the perceived
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disparity between what one should be and what one is.
In light of the three existing general paradigms of
resistance, Paradigm IV represents an alternative concept of
resistance.

Like Paradigm III, IV presumes that individuals

strive to maintain precepts concerned with their capacity to
be significant and held in regard by others.

This striving

is termed psychological security within the proposed model
and is similar to the constructs noted as self-esteem and
self-worth within Paradigm III.

However, Paradigm IV diverges

from III with regard to the process involved in maintaining
psychological security.

In Paradigm IV, the locus of resis

tance is not between past and present experiences, but
between future
ences.

(as depicted in fantasy)

and present experi

That is, within Paradigm III, resistance is viewed in

terms of persons'

desires to delimit their awareness and

life-style patterns within present, ongoing conditions to
ensure perceived congruence between present experience
"who I am") and past experience

(i.e.,

(i.e.,

"who I should be").

In contrast, Paradigm IV assumes that resistance occurs
because individuals strive to minimize the perceived dis
crepancy between "who I a m ” and "who I can be."
This theoretical distinction is significant since Para
digm IV presumes that the psychological significance of past
and present experiences affects the perception of psychologi
cal security primarily to the extent that these affect the
capacity of individuals to view their future,

fantasied
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experiences as being plausible.

From this perspective,

"what

significance to others I did demonstrate, and am demonstrat
ing" is important to the extent that it supports or dis
credits "what significance I can demonstrate."
In order for individuals to maintain the plausibility or
validity of their future, fantasied abilities to be signifi
cant to others in the face of past and ongoing interactions,
they strive to maintain enough cognitive flexibility to dis
count the occurrence of actual outcomes when these threaten
the validity of these fantasies.
the validity of their future,

Persons strive to ensure

fantasied dimension of experi

ence so that it remains as a viable and effective source for
acquiring psychological security.

This process is especially

important during periods when individuals are not experienc
ing sufficient actual outcomes to sustain desired levels of
psychological security.

During such occasions, persons tend

to "shift" towards their future,

fantasied dimension of expe

rience and to rely on this to compensate for the present lack
of actual outcomes to sustain their psychological security.
The theoretical model presented in Chapter II explains
resistance in terms of the dynamics involved in preserving
the validity of futuristic fantasies against the potential
threats posed by actual, ongoing experiences.

The cognitive

flexibility necessary to accomplish this is termed psycho
logical slack and serves as a means of underwriting fail-safe
systems for interacting within actual conditions of living.
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Much of one's behavior is directed toward developing modes
of interaction

(i.e., psychological slack) which provide

potential fail-safe features to preserve the validity of
future,

fantasied abilities by allowing persons to discount

the perceived validity of those actual outcomes which fail
to support the fantasies.
The modes of psychological slack required by individuals
to underwrite such fail-safe systems for actual, ongoing per
formance are acquired by consciously and/or unconsciously
persisting in certain beliefs and preferences,

adopting par

ticular emotional dispositions toward certain objects and
events,

and/or exhibiting particular characterological traits

in certain actual interactions.

How such patterns serve as

modes of psychological slack is discussed further in Chapter
II.

However, the essential concept is that such patterns

serve to establish for individuals the ability to perceive
that the absence of certain actual outcomes is because the
actual conditions are too inadequate or flawed, in and of
themselves.

This precept permits persons to preserve the

validity of future, fantasied outcomes since these are
depicted to represent their "true" performance capacity to
achieve these desired outcomes when the conditions are ade
quate in the future.

As such, modes of psychological slack

ensure the validity of the future,

fantasied dimension of

experience.
It is assumed that persons tend to seek modes of
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psychological slack when they feel insecure about their capa
city to demonstrate significance in relation to certain
objects.

By effectively discounting their actual performance,

individuals can shift to their future,

fantasied dimension,

and rely on those experiences to maintain psychological
security despite their actual conditions of living.
begins to acquire actual assurances

As one

(positive outcomes)

within particular performance situations, the degree of psy
chological slack one seeks to maintain is reduced accordingly.
When this occurs,

it is manifested as changes in the behavior

patterns which persisted previously as modes of psychological
slack.
Resistance to changing certain behavior patterns
beliefs,

feelings,

and actions)

these as fail-safe features.

(i.e.,

underlies a desire to retain

Relinquishing the ability to

underwrite fail-safe systems threatens a person's capacity to
insure the validity of certain future, fantasied experiences
against negative actual experiences.

Such resistance is

counteracted only to the extent that one acquires sufficient
assurances within actual, ongoing conditions that demonstra
tions of significance and impact will be achieved within
these conditions.

In many cases, the resistance tends to

perpetuate and intensify over time when the modes of psycho
logical slack ensure the validity of certain future,

fan

tasied abilities to be significant but, unwittingly, preclude
or minimize the opportunities for achieving actual assurances
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of these abilities.

These cases tend to occur when the fail

safe features reduce or preclude persons from sustaining the
commitment or level of actual performance necessary for
achieving such assurances.
Fail-safe systems which are so extreme as to preclude
one from acquiring certain desired actual assurances are
viewed as "dysfunctional."

Extended over time, the lack of

actual positive outcomes further intensifies the use of modes
of psychological slack, eventually leading to the symptoms
observed in many individuals seeking and/or in need of
psychotherapy.
Chapter III discusses the application of the model in
psychotherapy.

Client resistance as well as counter

resistance revolve around the "magical wishes" which abound
in psychotherapy.

A magical wish is an expression of a cli

ent's dilemma when confronted with a desire to seek out cer
tain actual assurances without acknowledging a commitment to
the performance required.

Fail-safe systems permit individ

uals to disavow such commitment so that the absence of cer
tain desired outcomes is not perceived as indicative of their
"true" performance capacity.

This helps to maintain the

effectiveness of shifts to future, fantasied experiences for
bolstering psychological security.
Magical wishes are comprised of expressed terms which
correspond to the kinds of changes clients say they wish to
experience in the context of their actual conditions of
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living.

In addition, a magical wish is associated with con

ditional terms which relate to clients'

desires to retain

enough psychological slack to underwrite effective fail-safe
features of performance.

Client resistance stems from the

persistence of the conditional terms and frequently estab
lishes counter-resistance on the part of a therapist.

These

sources of resistance occur because a client's conditional
terms are manifested as the client's rejection of the thera
pist's intervention to secure for the client the kinds of
changes indicated in the expressed terms of the client's
magical wish.

In response to such "rejection," a therapist

tends to feel ineffectual and applies his/her own fail-safe
features to defend against this threat to his/her psychologi
cal security.

The interactional effect is that a self-

perpetuating system of resistance occurs.
Three principles for dealing effectively with resistance
in therapy are as follows:

(1) identify the conditional

terms as well as the expressed terms of a client's magical
wish;

(2) accept and respond to these terms by restructuring

the dysfunctional characteristics of a client's fail-safe
system, to make it functional enough to yield the changes
indicated in the expressed terms of the magical wish;

and

(3) avoid undermining a client's fail-safe features which
are functional for the client.
Chapter III also presents a number of traditional cate
gories of clinical dysfunction to illustrate how the concepts
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of the model are applied.

A hypothetical therapy case is

discussed in Chapter IV to further describe the model's
implications for therapy.
It is hoped that the model contributes another useful
dimension for understanding and dealing with the perplexity
individuals experience in their strivings to cope with the
demands of living.

The model also underscores the notion

that the art and science of psychotherapy require the ability
and desire to be innovative and always sensitive to the needs
of clients.

These attributes are especially important when

the needs of therapists are such that clients are expected to
assume the risks of commitment before therapists are willing
to take such risks.

The excuses often used to provide fail

safe features for clinicians are the declarations that par
ticular individuals are "resistant to therapy" and/or have
"nontreatable character disorders."

The model suggests, how

ever, that many clinicians are resistant to individuals who
desire assurances of their significance before they are
willing to assign such significance to others.

Although the

validity of the theoretical model is subject to further
empirical and clinical evaluations,

it is presented in the

hope that it will be a useful contribution.
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